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Abstract
Eﬃcient transportation management requires good understanding of people’s travel
behavior. Most transportation planning models assume travelers are perfectly rational
in decision-making. However, much of the empirical evidence from psychology, eco-
nomics, and transportation has shown that perfect rationality is not realistic in mod-
eling travelers’ decision-making process. Thus existing transportation planning models
may provide inaccurate predictions to transportation planners.
Motivated by travelers’ route choice changes in response to the reopening of the I-
35W Bridge in Minneapolis, this dissertation shows that travelers are boundedly rational
(BR) in making route choices. Though the BR travel behavioral model was proposed in
the 1980’s, empirical validation of such behavioral principle using real-world data along
with a theoretical framework was non-existent. This study is dedicated to bridging
these gaps from both empirical and theoretical perspectives.
The ﬁrst contribution of this dissertation is the empirical veriﬁcation and estimation
of boundedly rational route choice behavior. By analyzing recorded GPS trajectories
from 143 commuters before and after the reopening of the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis,
we employ a probit model to estimate the bounded rationality parameters in Twin Cities.
Despite the behavioral appeal of bounded rationality, a rigorous study of boundedly
rational user equilibria (BRUE) solution has been lacking, partly due to its mathe-
matical complexity. This research oﬀers a systematic approach of deriving the BRUE
solutions analytically on networks with ﬁxed travel demands. Based on the deﬁnition of
ε-BRUE, where ε is the indiﬀerence band for perceived travel times, we formulate the
ε-BRUE problem as a nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP). With the increase of
the indiﬀerence band, the path set that contains equilibrium ﬂows will be augmented
and the critical values of the indiﬀerence band to augment the path set can be identiﬁed
by solving a sequence of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
A novel solution method is provided to obtain the BRUE solution set and numerical
examples are given to illustrate this ﬁnding.
To provide guidelines to policy-makers for congestion mitigation, this research also
explores an important phenomenon which should be avoided in transportation network
iii
design, i.e., Braess paradox. The classical Braess paradox was built upon the per-
fectly rational behavioral assumption. Under the framework of bounded rationality,
each equilibrium ﬂow pattern leads to a diﬀerent total system travel time, resulting in
non-unique network performance measures. Because of the non-uniqueness of BRUE
solutions, which particular equilibrium pattern should be used to compare network per-
formances before and after new roads are built remains a question. This dissertation
aims to study the analytical properties of Braess paradox under bounded rationality by
exploring the relationships between the occurrence of Braess paradox and the indiﬀer-
ence band as well as the demand level. The unveiled relationships oﬀer a guideline for
transportation planners to prevent the occurrence of Braess paradox and pave the way
for strategic transportation management under the bounded rationality assumption.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem statement
The I-35W Bridge has been playing a critical role in transporting commuters to down-
town Minneapolis and East Bank Campus of the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.
Its collapse in 2007 forced 140, 000 daily users (Danczyk et al. 2010) to switch to other
parallel bridges or to cancel trips. At the same time, an extra lane was added to the
parallel I-94 Bridge in each direction to reduce cross river traﬃc burdens. A year later,
the new I-35W Bridge was rebuilt and the addition of the bridge oﬀered commuters a
new option to cross the river. Surprisingly, only 100, 000 daily trips on average were
observed on the new bridge (Danczyk et al. 2010), which was more than 25% daily
trip decrease. This phenomenon was referred to as ‘irreversible network disruption’
(Guo and Liu 2011). According to Zhu (2011), the total travel demand in the Twin
Cities area only dropped slightly in 2008 due to economic crisis and the average daily
trip on the I-94 Bridge returned to the original level after the temporarily added lanes
were closed.
In reality, there may exist many possible reasons for irreversible network disruption.
This dissertation aims to explain the observed phenomenon from route choice behavior
perspective by employing the theory of bounded rationality.
As opposed to ‘rationality as optimization’, Herbert Simon, in 1957, proposed that
people are boundedly rational in their decision-making processes. This is either because
people are lack of accurate information, or they are incapable of obtaining the optimized
1
2decision due to the complexity of the situations. They tend to seek a satisfactory choice
solution instead. Since then, ‘bounded rationality’ has been studied extensively in
economic and psychology literature (See Conlisk 1996 for a detailed review). Bounded
rationality (BR) was introduced into transportation science by Mahmassani and Chang
(1987).
Although the concept of boundedly rational route choice behavior is not new, empir-
ical validation of such behavioral principle using real-world data and a BR theoretical
framework are non-existent. This study is dedicated to bridging these gaps from both
empirical and theoretical perspectives.
1.2 Research objectives and scope
This research aims to ﬁrst understand boundedly rational route choice behavior from
empirical analysis and then build a theoretical framework of boundedly rational user
equilibria. The goal of this study is to oﬀer thorough insights into implication of bounded
rationality for transportation planning. In summary, the objectives of this study are
primarily focused on:
1. providing a comprehensive survey on boundedly rational travel behavior models
and methodologies;
2. analyzing empirical travel survey data from the Twin Cities and estimating
bounded rationality parameters;
3. developing a mathematical framework of solving boundedly rational user equilib-
ria;
4. exploring Braess paradox under bounded rationality and oﬀering guidelines for
transportation network design.
In light of these objectives, this research is restricted to route choice behavior in
transportation networks with ﬁxed travel demands and a single user class for each
origin-destination (OD) pair. Travel time is the only determinant in route choice. In
other words, travel factors, such as travel time reliability and behavioral heterogeneity
within the same OD pair, are not considered.
3Accordingly, the scope of this research includes four components (illustrated in Fig-
ure (1.1)):
Literature review
BR models and methodologies
BR empirical evidence
Empirical analysis
BR parameter estimation
Twin Cities GPS data analysis
BRUE solutions methodology
BRUE set properties
Theoretical model
Application
Braess paradox
Figure 1.1: Dissertation components
1.3 Research contributions
Perfect rationality (PR) has been widely used in modeling travel behavior. As opposed
to PR, bounded rationality (BR) has regained researchers’ attention since its ﬁrst in-
troduction into transportation in the 1980s, due to its power in better modeling and
predicting travel behavior. Despite a small but growing body of studies on employ-
ing bounded rationality principle, BR travel behavior remains understudied due to the
4following reasons:
1. BR parameters are usually latent and diﬃcult to identify and estimate;
2. The existence of BR thresholds leads to mathematically intractable properties of
equilibria;
3. The non-uniqueness of boundedly rational user equilibria complicates transporta-
tion planning under the BR principle.
This dissertation aims to address the above three challenges and contributes signiﬁ-
cantly to the state-of-the-art of boundedly rational travel behavior from both empirical
and theoretical aspects.
Firs of all, the disruption and the rebuilding of the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis
provides us a rare opportunity to empirically study people’s route choices in response
to the change in road network’s topology. Accordingly, we propose an alternative route
choice theory, bounded rationality, to explain observed irreversible network disruption.
Though the concept of boundedly rational route choice is not new, its empirical veriﬁca-
tion has been lacking. To verify this behavioral assumption, a hypothesis is developed
that travelers will not switch to the new I-35W Bridge unless the saved travel time
exceeds an indiﬀerence band. Then GPS travel data are analyzed from 143 commuters
tracked before and after the bridge’s reopening to test the hypothesis and the indiﬀer-
ence band is estimated by employing the probit model. Unlike a large body of existing
literature employing experimental laboratory data to discover route choice behavior, this
dissertation makes the ﬁrst eﬀort of utilizing empirical ﬁeld data to uncover bounded
rationality and estimate associated behavioral parameters.
Theoretically, due to the existence of indiﬀerence bands, the boundedly rational user
equilibria (BRUE) is generally non-unique and the BRUE set is usually non-convex. As
a result, there exists little literature on developing equilibrium solution algorithms and
exploring its mathematical properties. To the best of our knowledge, this dissertation is
the ﬁrst study that provides a systematic approach of constructing the BRUE set based
on the ﬁnding that the BRUE set can be decomposed into ﬁnite subsets. Accordingly,
the topological properties of the BRUE set are studied based on each subset’s property.
These two theoretical contributions oﬀer a tool of predicting traﬃc ﬂow patterns and
lay the foundations of BR related applications, such as network design problem.
5With the methodology of solving BRUE sets in place, our third contribution is to
explore relationships between the occurrence of the Braess paradox and the indiﬀerence
band in the setting of BRUE. The ultimate goal of studying boundedly rational route
choice behavior is to provide insights into transportation network design so that Braess
paradox can be avoided in the ﬁrst place. The Braess paradox and its variants have
been extensively studied under the perfectly rational behavior assumption. However,
when the perfect rationality assumption is relaxed to bounded rationality, it remains
unclear under what conditions the Braess paradox occurs. This dissertation studies
the occurrence conditions in the classical Braess network as well as in grid networks
with Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) link performance functions. We reveal that Braess
paradox can happen in general networks if certain conditions are fulﬁlled and bounded
rationality may worsen the Braess paradox.
1.4 Dissertation organization
• Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive survey on existing boundedly rational travel
behavior models.
• Chapter 3 conducts an empirical analysis of irreversible network disruption of the
I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis by using boundedly rational route choice behavioral
assumption.
• In Chapter 4, the theoretical aspects of boundedly rational user equilibria are
discussed.
• Chapter 5 discusses the occurrence of Braess paradox under bounded rationality.
• Chapter 6 summarizes the research ﬁndings and the research gaps of this disser-
tation. Future research directions are also presented.
Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Introduction
Perfect rationality is widely used in modeling travelers’ decision-making behavior. As
opposed to ‘rationality as optimization’, Herbert Simon, in 1957, proposed that people
are boundedly rational in their decision-making processes (Simon 1957). This is either
because people lack accurate information, or they are incapable of obtaining an opti-
mized decision due to complexity of the situations. They tend to seek a satisfactory
choice solution instead. Since then, ‘bounded rationality’ has been studied extensively
in economics and psychology.
Mahmassani and Chang (1987) ﬁrst employed bounded rationality (BR) in model-
ing pre-trip departure time selection for a single bottleneck. Since then, there is small
but growing literature on incorporating bounded rationality into various transporta-
tion models, such as hyperpath assignment (Fonzone and Bell 2010), transportation
planning (Giﬀord and Checherita 2007; Khisty and Arslan 2005), traﬃc policy making
(Marsden et al. 2012) and traﬃc safety (Sivak 2002). All these studies indicated that
the BR assumption plays a very important role in transportation modeling. However,
“there is not yet much convergence among them” (Ridwan 2004). In other words, there
does not exist a standard BR framework for travel behavior study.
In this chapter, we aim to conduct a comprehensive survey on boundedly rational
travel behavior and propose a unifying framework. There are two types of behavioral
research (Simon 1982): “studies that are aimed at discovering and testing invariant
6
7laws of human individual or social behavior” and “studies that estimate parameters
we need for ﬁtting theoretical models incorporating known/believed laws to particular
situations where we wish to make predictions”. The former is to reveal behavior while
the latter is to model behavior. Accordingly, we will ﬁrst review behavioral studies
on discovering and verifying bounded rationality. Then we will summarize research on
modeling boundedly rational travel behavior.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.2, empirical and exper-
imental evidence is listed to support bounded rationality in modeling people’s travel
behavior. In Section 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, BR formulations are introduced in static traﬃc
assignment, dynamic traﬃc assignment and cognitive process models. Methodologies
of estimating boundedly rational learning parameters by utilizing static and panel data
from laboratory experiments are also introduced for each category.
2.2 Behavioural evidence on bounded rationality
2.2.1 Why not perfect rationality
In the following, we will present empirical evidence and anomalies to show that perfect
rationality is too ideal and a new behavioral framework is needed. Three cognitive
reasons are listed and are then followed by their manifestation.
Heuristic and bias
Psychologists and experimental economists veriﬁed that people use heuristic rules when
making decisions, leading to biases or systematic errors (Conlisk 1996). For example,
people react diﬀerently under the same situations when the problem is presented in
diﬀerent ways, called “framing eﬀect” (Tversky et al. 1981).
‘Debiasing’ experiments were conducted to test whether biases caused by heuris-
tic processes can be eliminated through repeated practice and adequate incentives or
punishments. However, many research indicated that biases are “substantial and impor-
tation behavioral regularities” (Conlisk 1996) and will not disappear due to deliberation
costs.
On the other hand, heuristics are also critical tools people employ when making
decisions. People try to tradeoﬀ “between cognitive eﬀort and judgemental accuracy”.
8Due to high costs of deliberation and information search, people tend to use heuristics to
ﬁnd the ﬁrst alternative which they are satisﬁed with instead of calculating an optimal
one.
Cognitive limit and deliberation cost
Hiraoka et al. (2002) showed that cognitive limits and deliberation costs play impor-
tant roles in route choices. They designed an experiment where subjects spoke aloud
while choosing routes. A protocol analysis was conducted to analyze subjects’ cognitive
processes from verbal data. Results indicated that drivers had the desire to choose
routes with less travel time, involving less cognitive resources and making them feel
comfortable while driving along. Among the above three route choice criteria, a choice
consuming less cognitive process dominated the other two criteria and drivers chose
routes dynamically when one route satisfying their criteria was found.
Behavioral heterogeneity
Drivers are heterogeneous in terms of their ages, genders, familiarity within a road
network and so on. There are two aspects regarding the impact of familiarity on route
choices. Lotan (1997) showed that more familiar drivers took longer habitual routes
than unfamiliar drivers. Hiraoka et al. (2002) showed that familiar drivers were more
responsive to current traﬃc conditions and had ﬂexibility to switch more frequently
en route for shorter paths, while new drivers preferred staying in their predetermined
routes no matter how traﬃc conditions changed.
Contini and Morini (2007) investigated job changing behavior from Worker Histo-
ries Italian Panel (WHIP) data in Italy. Two variables, future wages and risk-on-the-
job, were identiﬁed as two driving forces of the job change. A full rationality model
should imply “a positive relationship between future wages and risk-on-the-job”. In
other words, the higher future wages are, the higher the risk-on-the-job is. However,
Contini and Morini (2007) revealed from WHIP data that when individual eﬀects from
wage growth were included, the future wage was negatively proportional to risk-on-the-
job, which was inconsistent with the full rationality model. On the other hand, when
individual eﬀects were removed, future wage was positively proportional to risk-on-the-
job. In conclusion, while market forces drove towards a rational outcome, individual
9characteristics led towards an opposite direction. Though it is not related to travel be-
havior, this study revealed behavioral heterogeneity across the population in response
to a system change.
Violation of taking shortest paths
Transportation researchers from across the world found evidence that people do not
usually take the shortest paths and the utilized paths generally have higher costs than
shortest ones.
After evaluating habitual routes, only 59% respondents from Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts (Bekhor et al. 2006), 30% from Boston (Ramming 2001), 86.8% from Turin,
Italy (Prato and Bekhor 2006) chose paths with the shortest distance or the shortest
travel time. According to GPS studies, 60% of subject commuters in the Twin Cities,
Minnesota took paths longer than the shortest travel time paths (Zhu 2011) and high
percentage of commuting routes in Nagoya, Japan (Morikawa et al. 2005) and Lexing-
ton, Kentucky (Jan et al. 2000) were found to diﬀer considerably from the shortest
paths.
Nonexistence of perfect rationality via learning processes
Some opponents in economics claimed that people can improve their rationality via
repeated learning process. In other words, people can approach to unbounded ratio-
nality while making decisions everyday based on previous experiences. Conlisk (1996)
argued that learning mechanism does improve people’s decision-making towards the
optimal in some situations, but it can also hinder learning and adaptation due to
habit. This has been validated by a sequence of route choice experiments. Compared
to unfamiliar drivers, familiar drivers stick mostly to their usual driving routes which
may be longer than the shortest path (Lotan 1997). Under four diﬀerent route choice
rules, simulated drivers’ route choice behavior did not become rational through learning
(Nakayama et al. 2001). Instead, there were fewer rational drivers even after a long
process of route choices and they did not necessarily perceive system status accurately
even after a suﬃcient period of time.
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Infeasibility of dynamic traﬃc assignment
From modeling’s perspective, Szeto and Lo (2006) indicated that a dynamic traﬃc as-
signment model with a physical queue paradigm might not even converge. To solve this
anomaly, a tolerance-based principle was proposed that a route carrying ﬂow at a time
interval has a travel cost which is less than an acceptable tolerance from the shortest
travel cost.
In summary, all above statements show that perfect rationality cannot capture peo-
ple’s cognitive processes in decision-making and more realistic assumption is needed in
travel behavior modeling.
2.2.2 Why bounded rationality
Many researchers showed that perfectly rational models cause estimation and prediction
errors without considering people’s cognitive limits and deliberation costs, habits and
myopia. On the contrary, models considering these factors give better prediction.
Habit and inertia
People “place higher value on an opportunity if it is associated with the status quo”
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), because it can provide signiﬁcant energy saving to
cognitive thinking. Much empirical evidence suggested that habit plays a signiﬁcant
role in people’s behavior in stable situations (Bamberg and Schmidt 2003).
Habit may result from searching for an optimal solution in prevailing circumstances,
but it also prevents people from pursuing better alternatives when situation changes
and can collapse to “bad habit” (Jager 2003). Lotan (1997) compared the impact of
information on familiar and unfamiliar drivers. Ten familiar drivers and ﬁfteen unfa-
miliar drivers were selected to drive in the Newton network in Massachusetts coded in
traﬃc simulators. Results indicated that familiar drivers were reluctant to receive new
information and only considered salient information. Therefore most of them stuck to
their usual driving routes and did not necessarily minimize travel time.
Habit can be represented by a threshold in modeling travel choices. Cantillo et al.
(2006, 2007) applied a discrete choice model with thresholds to simulated SP/RP
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datasets to estimate and predict people’s mode choices, showing that a model not con-
sidering inertia overestimated the beneﬁts of transport investments substantially. Lotan
(1997) ﬁt an approximate-reasoning based model and a random utility model respec-
tively to driving simulation data in order to estimate and predict route choices. Results
showed that the approximate-reasoning based model outperformed the random utility
model. Carrion and Levinson (2012) studied commuters’ day-to-day route choices from
GPS data collected from 65 subjects for about 30 days, concluding that commuters
chose routes based on a speciﬁc threshold and might abandon a route if its travel time
exceeded the margin.
Mahmassani and his colleagues conducted a series of route choice experiments in
the 1990s showing that even when all path cost information was available to travelers,
commuters would not switch to shorter paths due to existence of inertia, which was
quantiﬁed by the ‘indiﬀerence band’ (Hu and Mahmassani 1997; Jayakrishnan et al.
1994a; Mahmassani and Chang 1987; Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan 1991;
Mahmassani and Liu 1999; Srinivasan and Mahmassani 1999). Accordingly a
boundedly rational route choice framework was proposed to capture people’s travel
behavior with information provision. By comparing commuter departure time and
route choice switch behavior in laboratory experiments with ﬁeld surveys in Dallas
and Austin, Texas, Mahmassani and Jou (2000) showed that boundedly rational route
choice modeling observed from experiments provided a valid description of actual
commuter daily behavior.
Myopia
Myopia refers to the fact that people do not usually concern for wider interests or
longer-term consequences while making decisions. Consumers manifest myopia when
purchasing large appliances and tend to buy models with lower price but higher energy
consumption (Conlisk 1996). Gabaix et al. (2006) conducted an experiment involving
a class of complex decision problems. Two behavioral models were proposed to predict
choices: one with partial myopia and one with full rationality. The model with partial
myopia ﬁt laboratory experiments better.
Similarly when making travel choices, travelers tend to switch to a link at an inter-
section which seems shorter for the time being but may lead to a longer route. Recent
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travel experiences also impact people’s travel choice more profoundly. Bogers et al.
(2005) used an interactive travel simulator “TSL” developed by Delft University of
Technology to investigate travel behavior. Subjects were asked to make route choices
among two alternative paths for 25 simulation days. En route information was provided
by a built-in dynamic traﬃc model and ex post information of realized travel times
were given in three diﬀerent scenarios: travel time on the chosen route for the latest
period, travel times on both routes for the latest period and travel times on both routes
for all past periods. Experiential results showed that people were myopic because their
previous day’s travel experiences, such as lateness and experience travel time, greatly
impacted their choices in the next day.
Less computational burden and solution existence
From modeling’s perspective, bounded rationality requires less computational burdens
and ensures existence of a satisﬁcing solution.
In large scale problems, it is diﬃcult to attain optimal solutions analytically. The
perfectly rational search model proposed by Gabaix et al. (2006) is not solvable and
suﬀers from curse of dimensionality and no convergence. A heuristic algorithm usually
admits a computationally tractable solution without losing too much accuracy.
According to Simon (1957), decisions are sought dynamically and will not terminate
till an alternative meeting a certain threshold level is found. This level will be adjusted
if a satisﬁcing alternative is diﬃcult to ﬁnd. “Such changes in aspiration level...tend to
guarantee the existence of satisfactory solutions” (Simon 1957). Similar results are found
in transportation literature. The traditional dynamic traﬃc assignment model with
perfect rationality may be infeasible, while a tolerance-based traﬃc dynamic ensures
existence of an equilibrium (Szeto and Lo 2006).
2.2.3 Boundedly rational travel choice models
Simon (1986) classiﬁed two types of rationality: substantive rationality (‘rationality
is viewed in terms of the choices it produces’) and procedural rationality (rationality
is viewed ‘in terms of the processes it employs’). Substantive rationality focuses on
the choice results subjective to certain goals, while procedural rationality describes the
cognitive process of a decision-maker. According to Simon (1982), bounded rationality
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is a more “ambitious” rationality concept, trying to capture both the substance of the
ﬁnal decision and the dynamical process of decision-making, based on empirical studies
and psychological research.
In terms of travel decision choices, there also exist two categories of travel behavioral
models: static traﬃc assignment (i.e., stable and time-invariant route choices) and
dynamic traﬃc assignment (i.e., temporal travel behavioral changes). Static traﬃc
assignment can be embedded with substantive bounded rationality. However, dynamic
traﬃc assignment does not correspond to procedural bounded rationality. Accordingly,
we add another category of “dynamic bounded rationality” to represent rationality when
decisions have to be made repeatedly as time progresses. In addition, there is another
school of literature on modeling human beings’ cognitive processes in route choices,
which is associated with procedural bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality (BR) is rather a more realistic behavioral foundation than a
new theory. Thus it permeates every part of travel behavioral modeling. To review
BR related models and methodologies, a thorough survey on static and dynamic traﬃc
assignment models should come along. Therefore, we will introduce various travel be-
havior models and show how substantive, dynamic and procedural bounded rationality
are represented.
All relevant models are summarized in Table (2.1). Column “Category” represents
three major types of bounded rationality. Column “Model” summarizes all the route
choice models we will discuss in this chapter. Column “Aspect” illustrates the decision
which is incorporated with bounded rationality, column “Representation” further ex-
plains how it is incorporated while column “Speciﬁcation” lists the speciﬁc form of the
associated bounded rationality parameter. Column “Estimated” indicates whether the
bounded rationality parameter is estimated or given in the corresponding model.
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The survey of each category of models is arranged as follows: at the beginning of
each section, a unifying framework diagram serves as a navigation map, providing a
general picture of each category (including elements and their relations) and how the
BR piece ﬁts the whole picture. Then we will introduce analytical models and estimation
methodologies under the unifying framework.
2.3 Boundedly rational static traﬃc assignment
2.3.1 A unifying framework for game-theoretical approach
Figure (2.1) illustrates a framework of equilibrium models. A large population of trav-
elers make route choices in a road network and suﬀer from congestion eﬀects leading to
travel costs or disutilities. The travel cost or the disutility is indicated in ovals which
represent latent variables (Walker 2001) and is also enclosed in a big box with dot-
ted borders because they are unobservable. Every traveler aims to minimize his own
travel cost or disutility. Bounded rationality thresholds can be embedded into either
cost or disutility functions in the form of “random error” or “rationality parameter”
or represented by the route choice principle, indicated in dotted hexagons. Individual’s
route choices and various types of equilibria, such as boundedly rational user equilibria
(BRUE), quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and boundedly rational Nash equilibria
(BRNE), are indicated in solid parallelograms, representing observable outputs. In this
section, we will introduce how diﬀerent speciﬁcations of travel costs or disutilities and
route choice behavior lead to diﬀerent types of equilibria.
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Figure 2.1: Boundedly rational game-theoretical framework in route choice
2.3.2 Static user equilibria
Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle says that people will take the path with the least disutility
(i.e., travel time, monetary cost, etc). A Wardrop user equilibrium (UE) is reached
when no one can improve his travel cost by unilaterally changing routes. At UE, all
utilized routes have the minimum travel cost while all unutilized routes have higher
travel costs. In other words, the following conditions hold at an equilibrium f∗:
Cwr (f
∗)− πw
⎧⎨
⎩= 0, if f
w∗
r > 0,
 0, if fw∗r = 0.
,∀r ∈ Pw,∀w ∈ W, (2.3.1)
where πw is the minimum travel cost connecting OD pair w, i.e., πw = minj∈Pw Cwj (f).
Under bounded rationality, at equilibrium, “every driver uses an acceptable path,
where a path is acceptable if the diﬀerence between its travel cost and that of the shortest
or least-cost path is no larger than a pre-speciﬁed threshold value” (Lou et al. 2010). In
other words, no one can reduce his travel cost by a threshold by unilaterally switching
routes. This threshold depends on network users’ behavior and varies among diﬀerent
OD pairs, which needs to be obtained through behavioral surveys and experiments.
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Given an indiﬀerence band, BRUE is shown to be non-unique (Lou et al. 2010).
Lou et al. (2010) proposed a path-based BRUE formulation and a link-node based for-
mulation for congestion pricing. The link-node based BRUE is shown to be more restric-
tive than the path-based one. Di et al. (2013) developed a nonlinear complimentariy
condition for one path-based BRUE:
C˜wr (f
∗)− π˜w
⎧⎨
⎩= 0, if f
w∗
r > 0,
 0, if fw∗r = 0.
,∀r ∈ Pw,∀w ∈ W. (2.3.2)
where,
C˜wr (f
∗): the indiﬀerence travel cost, computed by C˜wr (f∗) = Cwr (f∗) + ρwr ;
π˜w: the shortest indiﬀerence travel cost, equal to the minimum travel cost plus the
indiﬀerence band connecting OD pair w, i.e., π˜w = minj∈Pw Cwj (f) + ε
w;
ρ: an indiﬀerence vector and ρ = (ρwr )
w∈W
r∈P , where 0  ρwr  εw. ρwr represents
the deviation of route r’s actual cost from the shortest indiﬀerence travel cost, i.e.,
ρwr 
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
π˜w − Cwr (f), if Cwr (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,
0, o.w.
The above condition implies that, under bounded rationality, all chosen paths have
the same shortest indiﬀerence travel cost, equal to minj∈Pw Cwj (f) + ε
w. The unused
paths should have equal or larger indiﬀerence path costs. Denote FεBRUE as the ε-
BRUE path ﬂow solution set, including all the BRUE path ﬂow patterns. There exists
little literature on constructing the BRUE set because it is shown to be non-convex
(Lou et al. 2010) and thus its mathematical properties are intractable.
Di et al. (2013) developed a systematic methodology of constructing this set in trans-
portation networks with ﬁxed demands connecting multiple OD pairs. With the increase
of the indiﬀerence band, the path set that contains boundedly rational equilibrium ﬂows
will be augmented. Accordingly, the critical values of indiﬀerence bands to augment
these path sets can be identiﬁed by solving a family of mathematical programs with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC) sequentially. For a network with single OD pair, given
a sequence of ﬁnite critical points ε∗k, k = 1, · · · ,K, with ε∗0 = 0, ε∗K+1 = ∞, a BRUE
solution set is the union of K + 1 subsets:
FεBRUE =
K⋃
k=0
Fε∗kk . (2.3.3)
22
where Fε∗kk , k = 0, · · · ,K is the kth subset with associated critical indiﬀerence band ε∗k.
Di et al. (2014a) studied the topological properties of the BRUE set and showed that
generally the BRUE set is compact and non-convex. Given aﬃne linear link performance
functions, all the subsets are convex and the BRUE set is connected (Di et al. 2014b).
2.3.3 Boundedly rational Nash equilibria with ﬁnite players
Game theory models ﬁnite players’ strategic decisions in a conﬂict but cooperative
environment. Nash equilibrium is said to be achieved if no player can improve his
payoﬀ by chaning strategies. On the other hand, Wardrop user equilibrium is reached
when no traveler can improve his travel cost by unilaterally switching routes. Therefore
Wardrop user equilibrium considers inﬁnitesimal travelers in a non-cooperative Nash
game. Haurie and Marcotte (1985) showed that Nash equilibrium converges to Wardrop
user equilibrium when the number of players goes to inﬁnity. However, there exist few
studies on modeling boundedly rational route choices with game theory and establishing
relationship between boundedly rational Nash equilibrium and BRUE. Therefore we
would like to examine the literature on boundedly rational game theory.
Through repeated game experiments with ﬁnite players, researchers realized that
the perfect Nash equilibrium cannot be usually obtained. To explain these anomalies,
bounded rationality is then incorporated into a non-cooperative mixed-strategy game
in the form of inaccurate perception of payoﬀ or cost functions. McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995) assumed that game players are utility maximizers whose perception of utility
functions is subject to noise. Chen et al. (1997) argued that players only know their
subconscious utilities attached to each alternative instead of utility functions. Zhao
(1994) suggested that the cost function should be represented by a fuzzy function. The
associated equilibrium is “quantal response equilibrium” (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey
1995), “boundedly rational Nash equilibrium” (BRNE) (Chen et al. 1997) or “-
equilibrium” (Zhao 1994) respectively. In the following, we will mainly introduce the
seminal work proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
In a ﬁnite game (M, S, U), among M = {1, · · · , N} total players, player n has a
set of pure strategies Sn =
{
s1n, · · · , sJnn
}
. Each player knows strategy sets available to
himself and to others. The probability of player n taking strategy srn is p
r
n  pn(srn)  0,
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and
∑
sjn∈Sn
pn(s
j
n) = 1. Denote pn = {prn}r∈Jnn∈M.
Player n does not know other players’ utility functions but is aware of others’ choice
probability. Denote p−n = {prk}r∈Jkk∈M,k =n as the conjectured mixed strategy adopted by
players other than n. (srn, p
−n) is the strategy pair where player n adopts the pure strat-
egy srn and conjectures that all other players adopt their components of p. Therefore,
the expected utility of the rth pure strategy of player n, denoted as V nr , is a function
of the strategy pair, i.e., V rn = V
r
n (s
r
n, p
−n).
As V rn depends on others’ choice probabilities, let V¯
r
n be the expected utility over all
possible choices of all players other than n. Assume player n’s utility for each strategy
is subject to random error and is deﬁned as:
U rn = V¯
r
n + ζ
r
n, (2.3.4)
where ζn = (ζ
1
n, · · · , ζJnn ) is the perceived utility error vector for player n with i.i.d.
Gumbel distribution.
One example of the expected utility function V¯ rn is to assume that it depends on the
total number of players choosing alternative r (Seim 2006), i.e.,
V¯ rn (s
r
n, p
−n) = θXrn(s
r
n) +Nr(p
−n), (2.3.5)
where,
Xrn(·): a utility mapping only depending on player n’s strategy srn;
Nr: the total number of players choosing alternative r, depending on others’ choices.
Player n will take strategy r if U rn  U jn,∀j = 1, · · · , Jn, j = r. The probability that
player n selects strategy r is:
prn = P (U
r
n > U
j
n) =
eαV¯
r
n
Jn∑
j=1
eαV¯
j
n
, j = r,
where α is the scale parameter for ζrn. It also represents the rationality level of each
player. When varying α from zero to inﬁnity, the player’s choice behavior varies from
“placing equal probability over all alternatives” to “fully rational utility maximization”.
Every player has the same equilibrium conjecture of others’ path choices, i.e., pn =
pk = p∗. Therefore a statistical version of Nash equilibrium can be then deﬁned as
follows:
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Deﬁnition 2.3.1. In a ﬁnite game (M, S, U), a quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
is any π = (π1, · · · , πJn) ∈ S such that ∀n ∈ M, 1  r  Jn,
π∗(α) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
π ∈ S : πrn =
eαV¯
r
n (π)
Jn∑
j=1
eαV¯
j
n (π)
,∀n, r
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
. (2.3.6)
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) showed that QRE exists but is generally non-unique.
However, it is unique when α is restricted to be suﬃciently small. As α goes to in-
ﬁnity, there always exists one subsequence of π∗(α) which converges to a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Chen et al. (1997) argued that the mathematical interpretations of choice behavior
by introducing noise into the utility function cannot manifest human being’s bounded
rationality. Accordingly, a boundedly rational Nash equilibrium model (BRNE) is de-
veloped based on the assumption that the player does not know his utility function,
instead, he knows utility values associated with each alternative. This latent utility is
called “subconscious utility” and BRNE is one extension of QRE.
2.3.4 Threshold discrete choice model
Aforementioned studies mainly focus on modeling boundedly rational route choice be-
havior and parameters associated with bounded rationality are assumed to be known.
The main goal of the behavioral research is to “estimate parameters we need for ﬁtting
theoretical models incorporating known/believed laws to particular situations where
we wish to make predictions” (Simon 1982). Therefore BR parameter estimation is a
critical component of the BR research.
The discrete choice model is a common tool to estimate parameters. Within the
framework of the discrete choice modeling, the random utility maximization model
(RUM) is adopted in modeling and predicting drivers’ route choice behavior among
a set of ﬁnite paths. Provided perception errors are Gumbel distribution, RUM can
be expressed in the form of a multinomial logit model. The logit model assumes
paths are independent of each other and has independence from irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) property. In reality, however, many paths overlap with each other and are thus
not independent. To overcome this limitation, various RUM models were proposed:
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C-logit (Cascetta et al. 1996), path-size logit (Ben-Akiva and Ramming 1998), nested
logit (Jha et al. 1998), cross-nested logit (Vovsha and Bekhor 1998), multinomial probit
(Cascetta 1989; Daganzo et al. 1977; Jotisankasa and Polak 2006) and mixed logit or
multinomial probit with logit kernel (Ben-Akiva and Bolduc 1996). However, all these
models still assume utility maximization.
Within disturbed networks, for example, real-time information becomes available
or a new traﬃc plan (toll, addition/removal of roads) is implemented, travelers adjust
their behavor accordingly based on previous experiences. Habit plays a critical role when
travel choices are made repeatedly. Therefore, utility maximization is unrealistic and
a threshold representing habitual choice behavior should be introduced to characterize
habit.
Stimulus-response model
Stimulus-response theory, popular in psychology, economics and biology, provides an
eﬃcient tool of quantifying human being’s behavioral response by varying stimulus of
speciﬁc intensities. In psychology and economics, the stimulus-response studies focus on
the change in decision-makers’ preference or choice in response to the change in utilities
of alternatives. Biologists are interested in the dose-response study, which is the impact
of toxic levels on an organ or a tissue.
A large body of literature in psychology, economics and biology (Cox 1987; Krishnan
1977) indicated that the occurrence of a response depends on the intensity of a stimulus
and there exists a threshold under which no response is manifest. This threshold is
called “just noticeable diﬀerence” (Weber’s law) or “minimum perceivable diﬀerence”
(Krishnan 1977), which represents bounded rationality. If the response is discrete, such
as people’s choice or preference, several biological experiments (Clark 1933; Hemmingsen
1933) verify that no response occurs unless the logarithm of stimulus exceeds some
threshold. When the response is qualitative, such as perceived loudness/brightness
or dose quantity, Weber’s law reveals that the response intensity is proportional to the
logarithm of the stimulus. When making route choice decisions, the response is normally
discrete, so we will review stimulus and quantal response models.
Denote X as the stimulus and ε as the threshold. The threshold varies over sub-
jects and its distribution is normal with mean μ and variance σ, i.e., ε ∼ N(μ, σ).
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Then the probability of response can be calculated from the probit model (Clark 1933;
Hemmingsen 1933):
P (response) = P (log(X) > ε) =
∫ log(X)−μ
σ
−∞
1√
2π
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dt. (2.3.7)
If the distribution of the threshold follows logistic distribution with location parameter
μ and scale parameter s, then the probability of response is:
P (response) =
1
1 + exp
(
− log(X)−μs
) . (2.3.8)
The distribution of the threshold, including mean μ and variance σ (for probit
model), or mean μ and scale s (for logit model), can be estimated by employing the
maximum likelihood method.
Threshold mode choice model
One application of the stimulus-response theory is to study the impact of the transporta-
tion planning policy change on people’s choice behavior. Cantillo et al. (2006, 2007)
proposed discrete choice models with state dependence (due to inertias, Cantillo et al.
2006) and serial correlation (due to persistence of unobservable attributes across a se-
quence of choices, Cantillo et al. 2007). Travelers will not switch to a new mode unless
its utility is greater than that of the current mode plus a threshold, which is a function
of the diﬀerence between two experienced mode utilities.
Denote the utility of the alternative Ar as U
r
nt = V
r
nt(Xn, Znt, θnt) + ζ
r
nt, where ζ
r
nt
is the error term. The traveler n picks a choice r on day t based on a multinomial
logit model. Assume a change happens to some attribute attached to an alternative
mode on day t+ 1. Assume travelers make stable mode choice right after the change is
made. Due to inertia, the probability of switching from the current choice Ant = r to
An,t+1 = r
′, r′ = r is equivalent to:
U r
′
n,t+1 − U rn,t+1  Ir
′r
n,t+1, (2.3.9a)
U r
′
n,t+1 − U jn,t+1  Ir
′r
n,t+1 − Ijrn,t+1,∀j ∈ Pnt, j = r. (2.3.9b)
where,
Ir
′r
n,t+1: the inertia variable, represented by a random utility function depending on the
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utility diﬀerence, i.e., Ir
′r
n,t+1 = γn(V (Xn, Znt, θnt), V
r
nt − V r
′
nt );
γn: an unknown coeﬃcient varies randomly among individuals;
V (·): the utility function;
Xn: individual characteristics for traveler n;
Znt: trip features for traveler n on day t;
θnt: a vector of parameter needed to be estimated;
V rnt: the deterministic utility for the alternative r.
A multinomial logit model is formulated to calculate choice probabilities of each
alternative and transition probabilities. The maximum likelihood estimation approach
is used to estimate parameters and inertial variables. Two sets of data were collected
in Cagliari, Italy: the RP data in terms of people’s mode choices among car, bus and
train; the SP data requiring the choice between a new train service and the current
mode choice. Estimation results showed that a misspeciﬁed model without inertia and
serial correlation may lead to biases and errors when a newly implemented policy has a
substantial impact.
2.4 Boundedly rational dynamic traﬃc assignment
2.4.1 A unifying framework for dynamic travel choice process
Making travel decisions is a repeated learning process and three stages are usually con-
sidered during dynamic decision-making processes (illustrated in Figure (2.2)). These
stages are indicated in rectangles and enclosed in a big box with dotted borders because
they are unobservable. Individual’s socioeconomic characteristics, available information
and their route choices are indicated by solid parallelograms, representing observable
inputs or outputs. Before making decisions, travelers are assumed to have some knowl-
edge of networks from previous experiences. Salient information and new experiences
may trigger travelers’ update mechanism. Then adaptation to switch departure time,
route or mode is made based on certain learning principle, which will provide more
information to the next decision-making process. Due to the existence of habit, there
exists a threshold at each stage to capture more realistic behavior, indicated in dotted
hexagons.
Dynamical travel choices can be studied on a daily basis or within a day. According
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to diﬀerent time scales, a dynamic process can be represented by a day-to-day model or
a within-day model. In this section, we will ﬁrst review analytical models of day-to-day
and within-day dynamics and then introduce parameter estimation for each stage.
Departure-time
adaptation
Update  threshold
Route switch
threshold
Experience
Schedule delay
threshold
Travel time
updating
Route
adaptation
Information
Socioeconomic &
demographic traits,
Trip characteristics
Departure-time,
route, mode choices
Mode
choice
Mode switch
threshold
Figure 2.2: Boundedly rational travel learning process
One thing worth of note is that, the mode choice is indicated in a dotted box
because there does not exist literature combining departure-time and route choices with
mode choice, partly because people may not switch mode as frequently as they adjust
departure-time and route. However, we should bear in mind that a multi-modal BR
travel behavior process can be modeled within this framework. Moreover, destination
choice can be also considered in this framework especially when non-work trips are
modeled.
2.4.2 Day-to-day traﬃc dynamic
Day-to-day traﬃc dynamical systems model drivers’ route choice adjustment in re-
sponse to temporary changes of a traﬃc network based on previous experienced
travel costs. There are two classes of traﬃc dynamics in the existing literature: (1)
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deterministic user equilibrium dynamical systems (Friesz et al. 1994; He et al. 2010;
Nagurney and Zhang 1997; Smith 1979), adopting various route choice update mech-
anism, such as proportional-switch adjustment (Smith 1979), tatonnement adjusting
process (Friesz et al. 1994), dynamical projection (Nagurney and Zhang 1997) or link-
based adjustment (He et al. 2010); (2) stochastic day-to-day dynamics (Cascetta 1989;
Davis and Nihan 1993; Watling 1999), assuming drivers follow logit or probit model.
Provided certain regulation conditions, these dynamical systems converge to diﬀerent
types of equilibria: the deterministic user equilibrium dynamical systems stabilizes to
user equilibrium (UE) and the stochastic day-to-day dynamics’ equilibrium is charac-
terized by a stationary distribution with stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) as its mean.
In this section, we will discuss how BR is embedded into these two types of traﬃc
dynamics.
Deterministic day-to-day dynamic
The adjustment processes (Friesz et al. 1994; He et al. 2010; Nagurney and Zhang 1997)
assume: on each day, the ﬂow pattern tends to move from the current pattern f to-
wards the target pattern u, based on current day’s path costs C(f) or link costs c(x)
(Friesz et al. 1994; He et al. 2010; Nagurney and Zhang 1997). He (2010) proposed a
general framework of existing day-to-day dynamics:
f˙ = λ(u− f), (2.4.1a)
u = PrΩ(f − γC(f)), (2.4.1b)
where,
f : the path or the link ﬂow vector;
f˙ : the path or the link ﬂow change;
u: target ﬂow pattern;
λ: a positive constant determining the ﬂow changing rate;
u− f : a ﬂow changing direction;
Ω: the feasible path or link ﬂow set;
PrΩ(f−γC(f)): projection operator, projecting f−γC(f) onto Ω, where γ is a coeﬃcient.
The aforementioned day-to-day dynamics mainly focus on traﬃc evolution from
disequilibrium to equilibrium within a ﬁxed network. When the topology of a network
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is changed, such as a disrupted or restored network, travelers may behave diﬀerently
from when the network is stable and the existing perfectly rational day-to-day dynamics
will not work. He and Liu (2012) proposed a prediction-correction process to describe
travelers’ reaction within a disrupted network while Guo and Liu (2011) developed a
boundedly rational route choice dynamic to capture travelers’ route choices in face of a
restored network. As the dynamic proposed by Guo and Liu (2011) involves bounded
rationality, we will brieﬂy discuss this model.
Under certain regularity assumptions (Cantarella and Cascetta 1995), the existing
perfectly rational day-to-day dynamics have an unique ﬁxed point. Therefore they
converge to the same UE ﬂow pattern if a network ﬁrst disrupts and is then restored
to the original level. This cannot capture irreversible response to the network change
in Minnesota (Guo and Liu 2011). It was observed that, although the new bridge has
higher capacity than the collapsed one, under similar demand level and almost identical
network topology, the traﬃc ﬂow across the bridge decreased signiﬁcantly. Perfectly
rational day-to-day dynamics will predict the same amount of traﬃc ﬂow across the
bridge. By allowing drivers’ perception errors to vary in a presumed bound, a link-based
boundedly rational day-to-day dynamic (Guo and Liu 2011) successfully explained the
ﬂow reduction phenomenon because traﬃc evolves from one ﬁxed point towards another
within the BRUE solution set.
In the link-based boundedly rational day-to-day dynamic (Guo and Liu 2011), Equa-
tion (2.4.1b) is replaced with the following:
u = PrΩbr(c(x))(x), (2.4.2)
where x is the link ﬂow and Ωbr(c(x)) is the acceptable link ﬂow pattern induced by x.
The acceptable set induced by path cost c(x) is deﬁned as:
Pbr(c(x))  {r ∈ P : Cr(f)  min
j∈Pw
Cj(f) + ε}. (2.4.3)
where f is the path ﬂow vector.
According to (2.4.3), Pbr(c(x)) can be computed in the following steps: based on
the current link cost c(x), the path cost C(f) can be calculated for OD pair w. Find the
shortest path, the 2nd shortest path, · · · , until the pth shortest path which has the cost
diﬀerence from the shortest one less than ε, while the (p + 1)th shortest path with the
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cost diﬀerence from the shortest one greater than ε. Then these p paths are acceptable
paths.
After the acceptable path set Pbr(c(x)) is known, assign the demand to those ac-
ceptable paths for each OD pair, then Ωbr(c(x)) can be mathematically expressed as:
Ωbr(c(x))  {x ∈ X : x = Δf ,
∑
p∈Pbr(c(x))
fwp = d
w,∀w ∈ W}. (2.4.4)
The ﬁxed point of this dynamic is the BRUE instead of the unique UE. Therefore
the stability property of this dynamic is more diﬃcult to address. Its stability is deﬁned
as: the perturbation of a ﬁxed point will make the system to converge to a ﬁxed point
within the set. The new ﬁxed point can be the same or diﬀerent from the initial one.
Rigorous proofs of the stability property of the BR dynamic were presented in Di et al.
(2014b).
Stochastic day-to-day dynamic
The existing deterministic day-to-day dynamics mainly model path choices based on
the previous day’s experience, while the existing stochastic day-to-day dynamics have
the capability of capturing both travel time update and route adaptation illustrated in
Figure (2.2). In the following, we will ﬁrst give a general expression of the stochastic
day-to-day dynamic and then present how it can be relaxed to incorporate BR at each
stage.
Denote the expected state vector of the stochastic day-to-day dynamic as
[
gt
ft
]
. Then
the expected states of a stochastic day-to-day dynamic can be deﬁned in a compact form:[
gt
ft
]
= h
([
gt−1
ft−1
])
, (2.4.5)
where,
h(·): a nonlinear mapping which will be speciﬁed later;
gt: the perceived travel cost vector on day t;
ft: the path ﬂow on day t.
The mapping h(·) deﬁnes a nonlinear Markov process. It is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable with respect to the state if link cost functions are continuous. If all eigenvalues
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of the Jacobian matrix of h(·) are within a unit circle (Cantarella and Cascetta 1995),
the dynamic will converge to a stationary ﬂow distribution.
The mapping h(·) can be further speciﬁed according to two stages deﬁned by
Cantarella and Cascetta (1995). Cantarella and Cascetta (1995) built a unifying the-
ory of both day-to-day and within-day traﬃc dynamics, including learning/forecasting
mechanism and users’ choice behavior. In the following, we will introduce how to deﬁne
h(·) in these two stages.
Travelers update their perceived travel costs based on a weighted average of the
previous day’s perceived travel cost and the experienced cost (Cantarella and Cascetta
1995). Mathematically,
gt = λgt−1 + (1− λ)C(ft−1), 0 < λ < 1. (2.4.6)
In reality, travelers may be salient to the travel cost diﬀerence between the previous
day’s perceived travel cost and the experienced cost if its value is within a thresh-
old. Therefore, Wu et al. (2013) revised the cost update mechanism deﬁned in Equa-
tion (2.4.6) as follows:
gt =
⎧⎨
⎩λgt−1 + (1− λ)C(ft−1), if |gt−1 − C(ft−1)|  ε,Ct−1, o.w. (2.4.7)
This travel time updating along with a logit route choice model is applied to model
travelers’ day-to-day evolution within urban railway networks and this updating model
better captures the day-to-day dynamic (Wu et al. 2013). Due to boundedly rational
cost updating, this dynamic is not continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to its state
any more. Its convergence and stability properties, unaddressed by Wu et al. (2013),
are more challenging to identify and remain unanswered.
For users’ choice behavioral modeling, the expected path choice dynamic can be
deﬁned as a logit model ft = dP (gt), where P (·) is a logit probability. More generally
(Cantarella and Cascetta 1995),
ft = P (gt−1, C(ft−1))ft−1, (2.4.8)
where P (·) is a transition probability matrix, depending on previous day’s perceived
and actual costs.
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The transition matrix P (·) can be further decomposed into two parts
(Cantarella and Cascetta 1995): reconsidering previous day’s choice and choosing to-
day’s path. Then the probability of choosing a path is the probability of reconsidering
the previous day’s choice (switching choice) times the conditional probability of choosing
that path given that the previous day’s choice is reconsidered (path choice). BR can be
embedded into calculating both switching choice and path choice. The representation
of BR in these two choices along with the methodology of estimating parameters will
be introduced in Section (2.4.5).
2.4.3 Within-day traﬃc dynamic
Dynamic traﬃc assignment (DTA) models traveler’s temporal travel choice change.
Peeta and Ziliaskopoulos (2001) classiﬁed existing dynamic traﬃc assignment models
into four methodological groups: discrete-time mathematical programming, continuous-
time optimal control, variational inequality and simulation-based. To the best of our
knowledge, bounded rationality has been only embedded into the third and the forth
categories in existing literature, which will be explained in the following.
Variational inequality
Szeto and Lo (2006) indicated that a DTA model with a physical queue paradigm may
not even converge. To solve this anomaly, a tolerance-based principle is proposed that a
route carrying ﬂow at a time interval has a travel cost which is less than an acceptable
tolerance from the shortest travel cost.
Based on this principle, a nonlinear complementarity problem was formulated and
a heuristic day-to-day route-swapping algorithm was developed to solve dynamic user
optimal (DUO). To analyze the existence and uniqueness of the solution, a theoretical
gap was deﬁned as the minimum of the largest diﬀerence between the travel times of all
used routes and the shortest OD travel times. DUO exists if and only if the theoretical
gap falls within the acceptable tolerance. Therefore, existence of the dynamic equilib-
rium depends on both network topology and route swapping behavior. Furthermore,
there exist multiple dynamical equilibria.
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Simulation
Various DTA simulators, such as DYNASMART (Jayakrishnan et al. 1994a), DynaMIT
(Ben-Akiva et al. 1997) and RouteSim (Ziliaskopoulos and Waller 2000), are employed
to compute dynamic user equilibrium (DUE). Simulation cannot obtain analytical prop-
erties of DUE but it satisﬁes FIFO (First In First Out) and circumvents holding-back of
vehicles. DTA simulators usually include three components (Cantarella and Cascetta
1995): demand/supply model, learning/forecasting mechanism and choice behavior.
BR principle can be introduced into learning/forecasting mechanism and choice mod-
els, which will be discussed in detail in Section (2.4.5).
2.4.4 Boundedly rational dynamical game with ﬁnite players
In Section 2.3.3, a game-theoretical approach is introduced to model boundedly rational
decisions. When the game is played repeatedly, Chen et al. (1997) proposed a boundedly
rational dynamical game and established the connection between static and dynamic
game. Supposing that the subconscious utility a player has depends on that player’s
beliefs about others’ strategies, when the player repeatedly play the game, this belief
can be obtained by the observed choices of other players in the past. So a dynamical
adjustment process using ﬁctitious play is modeled where each player plays the game
based on others’ historic strategies.
Assume N players start with an arbitrary mixed strategy and then adjust their
strategies over time based on the observed play. The empirical distribution of player n
is P¯nt = (P¯
1
nt, · · · , P¯ Jnnt ), which can be calculated as:
P¯nt =
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
pˆnτ . (2.4.9)
where pˆnτ is the actual choice probability of player n at time τ .
The subjective utilities are calculated based on empirical distributions prior to taking
action. Travelers are myopic when making choice adjustment. It is shown that both
players’ beliefs about others’ strategies and actual choices converge in probability to a
boundedly rational Nash equilibrium (BRNE).
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2.4.5 Boundedly rational learning behavior estimation
In this section, we will discuss how BR is embedded into travel time updating and choice
adaptation stages and how the BR parameters are estimated from observed choices.
In the repeated learning process illustrated in Figure (2.2), as a result of
habit, commuters will not update their travel time perception if the perceived
one minus the predicted one is within a threshold. Moreover, they will not
adjust their departure time unless the diﬀerence between the preferred arrival
time and the actual arrival time exceeds a bound (Chen and Mahmassani 2004;
Hu and Mahmassani 1997; Jayakrishnan et al. 1994a; Mahmassani and Chang
1987; Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan 1991; Mahmassani and Liu 1999;
Srinivasan and Mahmassani 1999; Yanmaz-Tuzel and Ozbay 2009). This bound
for lateness and earliness are diﬀerent and people are usually more sensitive to lateness.
In addition, commuters will not switch routes if the diﬀerence between perceived travel
time and experienced one exceeds a bound (Akiva 1994).
Travel time perception updating
Jha et al. (1998) assumed that individuals update their travel time whenever new traf-
ﬁc information is obtained or new travel time is perceived. This assumption is un-
reasonable due to the existence of updating costs. Chen and Mahmassani (2004) and
Jotisankasa and Polak (2006) proposed that only salient information impacts travelers.
Travelers do not update travel time if the diﬀerence between the perceived travel time
Cˆnt and the experienced travel time Cnt exceeds some threshold. Let y
time
nt denote a
travel time update indicator for traveler n at the end of day t, which equals to 1 if
traveler n updates travel time after day t, and 0 otherwise:
ytiment =
⎧⎨
⎩0, if Cˆnt − Cnt  ε
time,o
nt , Cnt − Cˆnt  εtime,unt ,
1, o.w.
(2.4.10)
where εtime,ont , ε
time,u
nt denote travel time overestimation and underestimation thresholds
for user n on day t respectively. If εtiment is treated as a fraction instead of an absolute
value, then travel time updating only happens if |Cˆnt − Cnt|  εtiment Cˆnt. In this case,
overestimation and underestimation share the same fractional threshold.
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If travel time is random, Chen and Mahmassani (2004) proposed another updating
mechanism that a traveler would not update travel time perception until his conﬁdence
in all path travel times was below a desired level, i.e., αrnt  1σnC¯rnt , r ∈ P, where α
r
nt is
traveler’s conﬁdence in path r’s travel time, σn is the variance of the perceived travel
time over a segment of unit travel time, and C¯rnt is the mean perceived travel time of
path r.
Overestimation and underestimation thresholds are random variables depending on
individual characteristics and trip features. Therefore they can be expressed as:
time,ont = V
time
o (Xn, Znt, θnt) + ζ
time,o
nt , (2.4.11a)
time,unt = V
time
u (Xn, Znt, θnt) + ζ
time,u
nt . (2.4.11b)
where,
V timeo (·), V timeu (·): deterministic utility functions for overestimation and underestima-
tion;
Xn: individual characteristics for traveler n;
Znt: trip features for traveler n on day t;
θnt: parameters for traveler n on day t;
ζnt: error terms for traveler n on day t, is either ζ
o
nt or ζ
u
nt.
The probability of updating can be calculated by a multinomial logit or a multino-
mial probit model. If the traveler decides to update travel time, there are three classes of
models in travel time updating: weighted average (Nakayama et al. 2001), adaptive ex-
pectation (Nakayama et al. 2001) and Bayesian (Jha et al. 1998; Jotisankasa and Polak
2006). If myopic factor is considered, updating is reduced to Cˆnt = Cn,t−1, i.e., the
perceived travel time on day t is equal to the experienced travel time on day t− 1.
Departure-time and route choice adaptation
After travel time is updated, drivers adjust their departure-time and route choices
based on certain rules. There are two classes of research on modeling choice adap-
tation: the ﬁrst one is based on utility maximization (Chen and Mahmassani 2004;
Jotisankasa and Polak 2006) and the second one is based on bounded rationality. We
will only focus on boundedly rational departure-time and route choice adaptation.
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To study the impact of advanced travel information on people’s behavior, Mah-
massani and his colleagues conducted a series of experiments and showed that people
were boundedly rational when choosing routes repeatedly with information. These ex-
periments were run on an interactive simulator-DYNASMART, incorporating pre-trip
departure time, route choices and en-route path switching decisions. Subjects, as trav-
elers, picked departure time pre-trip based on the previous days’ travel experiences and
chose paths en-route at each node based on available information.
Let ydepnt denote a departure time switching indicator for traveler n on day t, which
equals to 1 if traveler n switches departure time on day t+1, and 0 otherwise. Traveler
n will not adjust his departure time unless the schedule delay (i.e., preferred arrival time
minus actual arrival time) exceeds some threshold. Early and late arrivals have distinct
indiﬀerence bands, denoted as εdep,ent , ε
dep,l
nt respectively, representing tolerable schedule
delay. Then,
ydepnt =
⎧⎨
⎩0, if T
∗
nt − Tnt  εdep,ent , Tnt − T ∗nt  εdep,lnt
1, o.w..
(2.4.12)
where T ∗nt, Tnt denote preferred arrival time and actual arrival time for traveler n on
day t respectively.
Similarly, let yroutenjt denote a route switching indicator for traveler n at the interme-
diate junction node j on day t, which equals to 1 if traveler n switches his initial route
or route en-route at node j after day t, and 0 otherwise. Travelers do not change pre-
trip route or path en-route unless the trip time saving (the diﬀerence between predicted
travel time of the current path and that of the best path from this node to destination)
remains within his route indiﬀerence band:
yroutenjt =
⎧⎨
⎩0, if Cnjt − C
b
njt  εroutenjt Cnjt,
1, o.w.
(2.4.13)
where,
Cnjt, C
b
njt: the trip times of the chosen and the best path for traveler n from node j to
destination on day t respectively;
εroutenjt : the relative indiﬀerence band, as a fraction of Cnjt.
The aforementioned indiﬀerence bands vary among the population over time and
thus are random. They are inﬂuenced by individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender,
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myopia) and real-time information.
When travel time is assumed to be random, Yanmaz-Tuzel and Ozbay (2009) ap-
plied another learning mechanism, stochastic learning automata (SLA), to study drivers’
departure-time choice adaptation in response to a toll change on New Jersey Turnpike
(NJTPK). Travelers have three options to depart for work: pre-peak, peak and post-
peak. Each driver’s departure time choice is assumed to be automated by a stochastic
learning automaton which generates a sequence of actions based on drivers’ past expe-
riences and interactions with the environment. The driver will not update his or her
departure time if the experienced utility falls within a conﬁdence interval from that of
the desired arrival time. Then the transition probability of the departure-time choice is
updated based on a linear reward-penalty reinforcement learning scheme. Learning pa-
rameters introduced in the reinforcement scheme are estimated from drivers’ departure
time choices observed from NJTPK toll data. This model successfully mimics NJTPK
users’ day-to-day travel behavior.
Estimation of departure-time and route choices
There are two schemes of estimating departure time and route choices under real-time
information: joint estimation based on joint probability and hierarchical estimation
based on conditional probability.
When estimating joint decisions of departure time and routes under real-time in-
formation, ydepnt and y
route
njt are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution.
Then the probability of switching both departure time and route is computed by a
multinomial probit model.
Departure-time and route choices can be also estimated by a hierarchical model
(Jha et al. 1998): the probability of selecting departure interval i and path j on day
t by individual n is based on a conditional probability instead of a joint probability:
P i,jnt = P
i
nt×P j|int , where, P int is the probability of selecting departure interval i and P j|int is
the conditional probability of selecting route j given the traveler n has selected departure
interval i. These two probabilities can be calculated by logit models respectively.
Given speciﬁcations for utility functions V (·), repeated observations of departure
time and route switching decisions made by N Commuters over T days can be modeled
as a multinomial logit or a multinomial probit function. The maximum likelihood
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estimation is adopted to estimate parameters in utility functions.
2.5 Boundedly rational cognitive process
In static traﬃc assignment, the traditional ‘perfect rationality’(PR) route choice
paradigm (Wardrop 1952) makes three assumptions regarding human being’s cognitive
processes:
• Each traveler is able to enumerate all alternative paths connecting his origin-
destination pair in a transportation network;
• Each traveler has access to information of all path costs;
• Each traveler is capable of picking the one with the least disutility.
The above assumptions are too restrictive in reality. First of all, due to the large size
of available paths in real traﬃc networks and people’s limited computational ability, it
is impossible to identify all feasible paths connecting each origin-destination pair. Sec-
ondly, accessing information of all paths is unrealistic due to the following reasons: (a)
No information provider can oﬀer all path costs; (b) The costly information acquisition
process prevents travelers from obtaining all information. In addition, there are many
factors aﬀecting path costs, such as travel time, travel distance, the number of traﬃc
lights and turns, weather, scenery, and so on. Some of these factors cannot be directly
measured from the ﬁeld or are diﬃcult to measure; (c) Human beings have limited cog-
nitive capabilities and are unable to discern two alternatives with similar utilities, not
mentioning ﬁnding the best routes in their minds.
In summary, a complicated cognitive process is involved in route choice. Though
previous two categories of BR models can describe static and dynamic boundedly ratio-
nal route choice behavior, the cognitive process leading to such behavior has not been
fully explored.
2.5.1 A unifying framework for boundedly rational cognitive processes
Figure (2.3) summarizes four types of cognitive processes (mental map formation, route
generation, information acquisition and alternative comparison) before making route
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choices. These cognitive processes are indicated in rectangles and enclosed in a big
box with dotted borders because they are unobservable. Individual’s socioeconomic
characteristics, available information and their route choices are indicated by solid par-
allelograms, representing observable inputs or outputs. Bounded rationality thresholds
can be embedded into each process, represented by dotted hexagons. In this section,
we will review how BR is modeled and estimated within each cognitive process.
Utility
Risk attitudesPerceptions
Indifference
relation
Preference
Cognitive threshold
K-shortest path
Cognitive cost
Mental Map
Route generation
Information
acquisition
Information
Route choice
Socioeconomic &
demographic traits,
Trip characteristics
Alternatives
comparison
Figure 2.3: Boundedly rational cognitive processes with random utility
2.5.2 Boundedly rational network recognition and route generation
The route choice behavior process can be decomposed into three stages
(Hato and Asakura 2000; Hiraoka et al. 2002; Ridwan 2004): network recognition; alter-
native generation and elimination; behavior decision. Bounded rationality is introduced
into the ﬁrst two stages. The model proposed by Hato and Asakura (2000) will be
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mainly discussed.
At the ﬁrst stage, each traveler has a perception value for each link. Perception value,
denoted as Cogijn for link ij, is a random variable depending on individual characteristics
and link attributes. A link cannot be recognized unless its perception value exceeds a
threshold εn. Mathematically, link ij can be recognized if P (Cog
ij
n > εn) > 0.5. A logit
model can be used to identify the mental map in a traveler’s mind.
At the second stage, routes are generated from the mental map based on some
path generation algorithm, such as K-shortest path, labeling approach (Ben-Akiva et al.
1984), parametric least-generalized cost path algorithm (Mahmassani et al. 2005), dou-
bly stochastic choice set generation (Bovy and Fiorenzo-Catalano 2007) or pareto paths
generation (Wang et al. 2009). K-shortest path algorithm, widely used in path set gen-
eration, searches for the ﬁrst K paths with the least path costs. This algorithm relaxes
the requirement of obtaining the shortest paths and reduces computational burdens,
which reﬂects the BR principle.
Given a path set, travelers extract attributes of each generated path. Each path has
many attributes, but only partial attributes are evaluated. Assume each path attribute
is attached with a reference value εk, which is a random error with i.i.d. Gumbel
distribution. For example, the distance of the alternative path should be within 1.33
times the shortest distance and the number of left or right turns cannot exceed 5 times.
Then those inferior paths are eliminated if the probability of one attribute V rk of path
r exceeding εk, i.e., P (V
r
k > εk) > 0.5.
At the third stage, based on the extracted routes, the utility theory
(Hato and Asakura 2000) or the inductive rule-based theory (Ridwan 2004) is assumed
for route choice behavior and traﬃc assignment is conducted. Hato and Asakura (2000)
showed that the chosen routes estimated by the BR model matched the stated preference
survey better than the model with full network.
2.5.3 Path information search
When the BR principle is used to model travelers’ route choice behavior, some re-
searchers argued that travelers do not take the shortest paths because they are not
capable of perceiving actual travel costs due to limited cognitive capacities, or it is too
costly to search information over all alternative paths (Gao et al. 2011). Therefore,
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Gao et al. (2011) proposed a cognitive cost model to capture people’s route choices in
complex contexts with costly information acquisition.
In cognitive cost model, the path travel time is assumed to be random. Before
searching, travelers only know the mean and the variance. If they decide to search
information, travelers will know the exact travel time of the searched path; however,
search consumes cognitive cost. Therefore search action is the trade-oﬀ between travel
beneﬁt and cognitive cost. Accordingly, the probability of choosing path r given a choice
set Pn for traveler n is mainly composed of two parts:
P (r|Pn) = P (r|Pn,no search)P (no search) + P (r|Pn, search). (2.5.1)
If traveler n decides to search information, the probability of choosing path r given
a choice set Pn is further decomposed into the sum of three parts:
P (r|Pn, search) =
∑
s
T sn∑
t=1
P (r|t,Pn,Hsn)P (t|Hsn)P (Hsn), (2.5.2)
where,
P (Hsn): the probability of individual n belonging to search class s;
P (t|Hsn): the probability of searching path information till stage t given class Hsn;
P (r|t,Pn,Hsn): the probability of choosing path r given information is searched till stage
t. Logit models are used to calculate all three probabilities.
In the following, we will mainly introduce the methodology of computing P (t|Hsn),
because it involves cognitive process modeling. To reﬂect that a traveler chooses a
satisfying route due to information availability, cognitive constraints and time limit,
Gao et al. (2011) adapted a directed cognition model (Gabaix et al. 2006) proposed in
economics.
Let μrsnt, σ
rs
nt be mean and standard deviation of path travel cost r for individual n
from class s at stage t respectively. They are random variables at stage t when search
is conducted till t − 1. At stage t, traveler n decides to continue search or stop. To
compute P (t|Hsn), the utilities associated with these two actions are deﬁned as:
V (go at t|Hsn) = θscost + θsbenefitBsnt(go),
V (stop at t|Hsn) = θsbenefitBsnt(stop),
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where,
Bsnt(go): the expected maximum beneﬁt of searching at stage t, computed in Equa-
tion (2.5.4a);
Bsnt(stop): the beneﬁt of stopping search at stage t, computed in Equation (2.5.4b);
θscost, θ
s
benefit: cost and beneﬁt coeﬃcients, which need to be estimated.
If search stops at stage t, there is no search cost and thus V (stop at t|Hsn) does not
contain the term θscost. On the other hand, when search is conducted, a higher beneﬁt
will be obtained. Bsnt(go) and B
s
nt(stop) are deﬁned as follows:
Bsnt(go) =
∫
μrsnt,σ
rs
nt
ln
∑
r∈Pn
exp [V rsnt (μ
rs
nt, σ
rs
nt)] f(μ
rs
nt, σ
rs
nt)dμ
rs
ntdσ
rs
nt, (2.5.4a)
Bsnt(stop) = ln
∑
r∈Pn
exp
(
V rsn,t−1
)
, (2.5.4b)
where,
V rsnt (μ
rs
nt, σ
rs
nt): the utility of choosing path r for individual n from class s at stage t,
which is a linear function of travel time’s mean and standard deviation;
f(μrsnt, σ
rs
nt): the joint distribution of path travel time means and standard deviations
given the search operation.
Gao et al. (2011) estimated route choice parameters from simulated revealed pref-
erence data among three alternative routes from home to workplace. The estimation
results showed that a model with information acquisition gave more accurate parameter
estimates than those without.
2.5.4 Minimum perceivable diﬀerence model
Most discrete choice models assume implicitly the existence of a preferable ordering over
alternatives even if the diﬀerence in utilities is negligible. Psychological experiments
(Guilford 1954) showed that people may be indiﬀerent to two alternatives with similar
utilities.
Ridwan (2004) deﬁned three fuzzy preference relations for two alternatives: strict
preference; indiﬀerence; incomparability. A fuzzy choice function was proposed cap-
turing the fuzziness feature of choices to calculate their rankings. Krishnan (1977)
proposed a minimum perceivable diﬀerence (MPD) model describing travelers’ mode
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choices among two alternatives with two relations: strict preference and indiﬀerence.
Denote Ui as the utility of alternative Ai, i = 1, 2. It can be expressed as the sum of a
deterministic component Vi and a random component ei: Ui = Vi + ei. Denote ε as an
indiﬀerence threshold. The ordering over two alternatives and its associated probability
can be deﬁned as follows:
1. A1  A2 if U1 > U2 + ε, A1 will be chosen with probability 1;
2. A2  A1 if U2 > U1 + ε, A2 will be chosen with probability 1;
3. A1 ∼ A2 if |U1 − U2|  ε, A1 and A2 will be chosen with probability θ and 1− θ
respectively.
Denote the probability of preferring A1 and A2 as π1 and π2 respectively, and the
probability of being indiﬀerent to A1 and A2 by π12. Given the distribution of e1 and
e2, the above preferring probability can be computed based on utility maximization.
The probabilities of choosing A1 and A2 are:
P (A1) = π1 + θπ12,
P (A2) = π2 + (1− θ)π12.
where θ is the probability of choosing A1 given A1 and A2 have the indiﬀerence relation.
Given choices made by N individuals, the likelihood function is: L =∏N
n=1 P (A
(n)
1 )P (A
(n)
2 ). The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate param-
eters as follows:
min − log(L)
s.t. ε  0, (2.5.5a)
0  θ  1. (2.5.5b)
The estimated threshold ε is the by-product of the above program. The shortcoming of
the model is that only two alternatives are considered and it becomes complicated or
impossible to implement when multiple alternatives are involved.
Chapter 3
Empirical analysis of boundedly
rational route choice behavior
3.1 Introduction
The I-35W Mississippi River bridge plays a critical role in transporting commuters to
downtown Minneapolis and the University of Minnesota. Its collapse in 2007 forced
140, 000 daily users (Guo and Liu 2011; Zhu et al. 2010) to switch to other parallel
bridges or to cancel their trips. Accordingly, the I-94 Bridge was restriped with one
more lane to relieve traﬃc pressure across the river. A year later, a replacement I-35W
bridge was rebuilt over the same location and the extra lanes on I-94 were closed. The
addition of the bridge oﬀered commuters another option to cross the river. Surprisingly,
only 100, 000 daily trips on average were observed on the new bridge (He and Liu 2012;
Zhu 2011). According to Zhu (2011), the total travel demand in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area dropped slightly in 2008 due to the economic crisis, but not
enough to explain this fall-oﬀ. In contrast, daily trips on the I-94 Bridge returned
to the original level before the I-35W bridge collapsed. Therefore, we assume that
variation in travel demands is not the main reason for the signiﬁcant traﬃc reduction
on the replacement bridge.
To further understand the aforementioned phenomenon, two major GPS-based stud-
ies, including 143 commuters whose route choices might be aﬀected by the addition of
the new link were conducted (Carrion and Levinson 2012; Zhu 2011; Zhu and Levinson
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2012). These commuters’ trips were tracked by GPS two to three weeks before and
eight to ten weeks after the reopening of the new I-35W bridge. Each commuter’s day-
to-day commuting routes and associated travel time could be drawn from GPS data.
By comparing route choices before and after the new bridge was rebuilt, it is posited
that commuters’ “stickiness of driving habit” Zhu (2011) prevented them from taking
the new bridge and thus resulted in a traﬃc ﬂow drop on the new bridge. There may
also be perception errors at work. Moreover, Zhu (2011) further calculated travel time
diﬀerences between the routes actually taken and the shortest time routes from GPS
data. Fewer than 40% of commuters took the shortest paths, though 90% of subjects
took routes which were within 5 minutes of the shortest paths and almost no commuter
chose a route 20 minutes longer than the shortest path.
Utilizing the same GPS dataset, Carrion and Levinson (2012) modeled the time a
commuter consistently left his current bridge choice for other alternative bridges and
found that commuters chose routes based on a speciﬁc threshold and might abandon
a route if its travel time exceeded the margin. This threshold depended on the social-
demographics of subjects and varied day-to-day.
Previous studies focused on estimating indiﬀerence bands from laboratory experi-
ment data. For example, Mahmassani and Chang (1987) estimated indiﬀerence bands
by utilizing laboratory experiment data. By comparing commuter departure time and
route choice switch behavior in laboratory experiments with ﬁeld surveys in Dallas and
Austin, Texas, Mahmassani and Jou (2000) showed that boundedly rational route choice
modeling observed from experiments provided a valid description of actual commuter
daily behavior. However, whether laboratory experimental experiences can represent
actual commuter daily behavior still remains unclear.
Other studies incorporated given values of the thresholds into their route choice
models, such as 20% of the mean travel time or 0.5 times the mean travel time
of certain previous trips (Carrion and Levinson 2012; Yanmaz-Tuzel and Ozbay 2009;
Zhu and Levinson 2012). These thresholds were obtained from experience or assump-
tions and served as inputs of speciﬁc route choice behavior models. Therefore the
adoption of a given value may not be valid.
People do not choose routes irrationally. Yet, the empirical evidence argues that
travelers do not always select the shortest travel time paths, but the chosen routes are
47
within some threshold from the shortest ones. This chapter examines the phenomenon of
boundedly rational route choice behavior with GPS travel data collected in Minneapolis
in 2008 (Carrion and Levinson 2012; Zhu 2011; Zhu and Levinson 2012). The disruption
and the rebuilding of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis provides us a rare opportunity
to use GPS travel survey data to study route choices in response to the change in
road network’s topology. This study oﬀers the ﬁrst empirical estimation of bounded
rationality parameters from GPS data.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next Section focuses on the
theoretical background of route choice. In Section 3.3, we discuss the details of the
GPS data and present two categories of commuters of interest. Trip distribution among
bridges over the Mississippi River is also presented. In Section 3.4, travel time saving by
taking the new I-35W bridge is calculated based on a speed map pooled from GPS com-
muting trips. In Section 3.5, the boundedly rational route choice model is presented and
we will show that subjects who used the old I-35W bridge display diﬀerent behavioral
patterns compared to those who never used the old bridge. Accordingly, in Section 3.6,
indiﬀerence bands for old-users and non-users are estimated separately using GPS travel
survey data.
3.2 Theoretical Background
3.2.1 Boundedly rational route choice behavior
In practice, most transportation planning software packages employ route choice algo-
rithms based on Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle Wardrop (1952) that people take the shortest
path(s) when traﬃc assignment is performed. In the academic literature, route choice
is often considered within the framework of random utility maximization (RUM), each
driver is assumed to take the route with the maximum utility among a set of ﬁnite paths.
Each path is attached with several attributes, including travel time, distance, overlap
with other paths, reliability, the number of traﬃc lights and turns, weather, scenery and
so on. Provided perception errors are Gumbel or normal distribution, stochastic user
equilibrium model can be expressed in the form of a multinomial logit or probit model.
One critique of both Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle and RUM is the assumption that
people are “utility maximizers” (where utility is either travel time (Wardrop) or a bundle
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of factors including travel time (RUM)). Alternative hypotheses that are empirically
based posit that people actually make decisions by strategies (Simon 1982), heuristics
(Conlisk 1996), elimination by aspects (Tversky 1972), norms (Conlisk 1996) and/or
rules (Nakayama et al. 2001; Lotan 1997), rather than solving an optimization.
Therefore people do not always choose the alternative with the maximum utility.
Evidence from revealed route choice behavior ﬁnds after evaluating habitual routes,
only 59% of respondents from Cambridge, Massachusetts (Bekhor et al. 2006), 30% from
Boston (Ramming 2001), and 86.8% from Turin, Italy (Prato and Bekhor 2006) chose
paths with the shortest distance or shortest travel time. According to GPS studies, 90%
of subjects in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region took paths one-ﬁfth longer than average
commute time (Zhu 2011) and a high percentage of commuting routes were found to
diﬀer considerably from the shortest paths in Nagoya, Japan (Morikawa et al. 2005) and
Lexington, Kentucky (Jan et al. 2000). All ﬁndings above revealed that people do not
usually take the shortest paths and the utilized paths generally have higher costs than
shortest ones.
To relax the unrealistic assumption that only the shortest paths are used, several
route choice behavior models were proposed (Zhang 2011). This chapter examines one
alternative of the existing route choice behavior theories, i.e., bounded rationality. It
says that people do not always select the shortest paths, but the chosen routes are
within some threshold from the shortest ones.
As opposed to ‘rationality as optimization’, Herbert Simon, in 1957, proposed that
people are boundedly rational in their decision-making processes (Simon 1957). This is
either because people lack accurate information, or they are incapable of obtaining an
optimized decision due to complexity of the situation. They tend to seek a satisfactory
choice solution instead. Since then, bounded rationality has been studied extensively in
economics and psychology. Bounded rationality in decision-making may also result from
habit and inertia. People “place higher value on an opportunity if it is associated with
the status quo” (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), because it can provide signiﬁcant
energy saving to cognitive thinking. A large amount of empirical evidence ﬁnds that
habit plays a signiﬁcant role in behavior in stable situations (Bamberg and Schmidt
2003).
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In travel behavior study, a series of experiments was conducted in the 1990s to em-
pirically validate bounded rationality (Hu and Mahmassani 1997; Jayakrishnan et al.
1994a; Mahmassani and Chang 1987; Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan 1991;
Mahmassani and Liu 1999; Srinivasan and Mahmassani 1999). These experiments
were run on an interactive simulator – DYNASMART, incorporating pre-trip
departure time, route choices and en-route path switching decisions. Subjects,
as travelers, picked departure time pre-trip based on previous days’ travel ex-
periences and chose paths en-route at each node based on available informa-
tion. The experimental results showed that, in the repeated learning process,
as a result of habit, commuters would not adjust their departure time unless
the diﬀerence between preferred arrival time and actual arrival time exceeded a
bound (Chen and Mahmassani 2004; Hu and Mahmassani 1997; Jayakrishnan et al.
1994a; Mahmassani and Chang 1987; Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan 1991;
Mahmassani and Liu 1999; Srinivasan and Mahmassani 1999). This bound for
lateness and earliness diﬀered and people were usually more sensitive to lateness.
Bounded rationality was also found in mode choices. Cantillo et al. (2006, 2007)
indicated that there existed a threshold when the impact of the transportation planning
policy change was evaluated on choice behavior. Travelers would not switch to a new
mode unless its utility was greater than that of the current mode plus a threshold, which
was a function of the diﬀerence between two experienced mode utilities. Then a discrete
choice model with thresholds was applied to simulated SP/RP datasets to estimate and
predict mode choice. The prediction results showed that a model without considering
inertia overestimated beneﬁts of transport investments substantially.
3.2.2 Threshold stimulus-response models
The existence of a threshold in choice behavior has also long been explored in other
ﬁelds and the model describing this behavior is called “threshold stimulus-response”
model. The stimulus-response model, popular in biology, psychology and economics,
provides an eﬃcient method of quantifying behavioral response by varying stimulus of
speciﬁc intensities.
Biologists are interested in dose-response, which explores the impact of toxic levels
on an organ or a tissue. In psychology and economics, stimulus-response studies focus
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on the change in decision-makers’ preferences or choices in response to the change in
utilities of alternatives. The occurrence of a response depended on the intensity of a
stimulus and there existed a threshold under which no response was manifest (Cox 1987;
Krishnan 1977). This threshold was named “just noticeable diﬀerence” by Weber or
“minimum perceivable diﬀerence” by Krishnan (1977).
When the response is qualitative, such as dose quantity, Weber’s law revealed that
the response intensity is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus. If the response
is discrete, such as choices or preferences, several biological experiments (Clark 1933;
Hemmingsen 1933) veriﬁed that no response occurred unless the logarithm of stimulus
exceeded some threshold. Several models, such as the threshold dose-response models
(Cox 1987), minimum perceivable diﬀerence model (Krishnan 1977), and biological pro-
bit or logit model (Krishnan 1977), were proposed to estimate the threshold. These
models will be brieﬂy discussed subsequently.
• Dose-response models (Cox 1987) assumed that the probability of response is zero
if the amount of dosage is below a threshold parameter and follows logit or probit
model if it is more than the threshold. Cox (1987) showed that the threshold
model ﬁt data better than traditional logit or probit model.
• The minimum perceivable diﬀerence model (Krishnan 1977) assumed indiﬀerence
between two alternatives if the diﬀerence of their values falls within a threshold.
Therefore, a third relation (i.e., indiﬀerence) other than ‘greater than’ or ‘less than’
was introduced. The threshold parameter was estimated via maximum likelihood
method.
• In the biological probit or logit model (Krishnan 1977), the threshold is assumed
to be a random variable with normal or logistic distribution and therefore a probit
or a logit regression can be used to estimate distribution related parameters. The
biological probit model was shown to predict responses more accurately than the
logit model.
This chapter employs threshold stimulus-response framework to model route choice
behavior and estimate associated thresholds.
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3.3 Route choice observations
GPS studies (Zhu 2011) provide the following data for 143 subjects:
• Each subject’s home and work locations;
• Each subject’s day-to-day commuting routes;
• Each subject’s day-to-day travel time.
Most subjects use more than one path and switch routes from time to time. There-
fore we deﬁne a “commonly chosen route” as the route a commuter uses most frequently
during the study period. The commonly chosen route from the beginning of the study
period up to September 18, 2008 (the day when the replacement I-35W bridge was
opened) is the “before-route”, and the one from September 18, 2008 until the end of
the study is the “after-route”.
Remark. 1. The same routes are deﬁned as the ones which overlap at least 95% in
length and start within a 600 m (approximately 4 city blocks) radius from home
and end in a 600 m radius from the work location.
2. For each commuter, his or her experienced travel time on a path varies from day
to day due to uncertainty in traﬃc conditions. Therefore “average travel time”
on a before-route or on an after-route for a commuter is computed as the mean of
day-to-day GPS measured travel time on that route when he or she uses it.
3.3.1 Subject classiﬁcation
A “crosser” is the commuter whose home and work locations are on diﬀerent sides of
the river. Speciﬁcally, a crosser’s commuting route options may be enlarged by the
addition of the new bridge. Otherwise the subject is a “non-crosser”. In general a non-
crosser’s route options are not enlarged by the existence of the new bridge. (Note: some
individuals, nominally non-crossers, but in fact “double-crossers”, may have crossed the
river twice on certain routes from home to work, those individuals have been removed
from the analysis, as the sample size was too small. (“Triple-crossers” etc. were not
observed.))
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The addition of the new bridge may or may not save crossers’ average travel time.
Denote C
(n)
b , C
(n)
a as average travel times experienced by commuter n before and after
the reopening of the new bridge. When the average travel time on the after-route minus
that on the before-route is less than zero, i.e., C
(n)
a −C(n)b < 0, we say that the addition
of the new bridge saves commuter n’s travel time, or else it does not.
Table (3.1) shows the number of crossers and non-crossers. The “Change” column
refers to those commuters who change their routes after the addition of the bridge,
i.e., their before-routes and after-routes are diﬀerent. Or else they belong to the “No
change” column. The “Save time” row refers to those whose average travel time on
after-routes is shorter than that on before-routes.
Table 3.1: Statistics of crossers and non-crossers
Type
Change No
change
Total (ex-
cluding
missing
data)
Subjects
with in-
complete
observa-
tions
Total (in-
cluding
missing
data)
C1 C2 C3=C1+C2 C4 C5=C3+C4
Non-crosser
Save
time
5 16 21
0 30
Save no
time
0 9 9
Crosser
Save
time
47 31 78
19 113
Save no
time
2 14 16
Total 54 70 124 19 143
Remark. There are 19 crossers whose route choice observations before the addition
of the bridge were missing, therefore they are classiﬁed as “Subjects with incomplete
observations” in column C4.
53
When the addition of the new bridge saves crossers’ commuting time, a crosser
chooses either to change to the new bridge or not. Thus we further divide those crossers
into the following two categories:
• A “Switcher” is a crosser who switches to the new I-35W bridge as his or her
after-route given his or her travel time can be shortened by the new bridge;
• A “Stayer” is a crosser whose travel time can be improved by the new bridge but
stays on his or her before-route, i.e., the before-route and the after-route are the
same.
Figure (3.1) illustrates examples of a non-crosser, a switcher, a stayer and a crosser
with no time saving. The I-35W bridge is indicted by the purple line. In Figure (3.1a),
the non-crosser’s before-route and after-route are the same because he does not need to
cross the river and thus his route is not inﬂuenced by the new bridge. In Figure (3.1b-
3.1c), the switcher uses two diﬀerent routes before the bridge was rebuilt and after,
while the stayer uses the same route which is not via the I-35W bridge. In Figure (??),
taking the new bridge cannot improve the crosser’s travel time, so he stays on the same
route.
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I-35W
before-route/
after-route
(a) Non-crosser
after-route
I-35W
before-route
(b) Switcher
I-35W
before-route/
after-route
(c) Stayer
Figure 3.1: Examples of subjects
In this study, only 47 switchers and 31 stayers are considered. So there are 78
subjects of interest.
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3.3.2 Bridge usage analysis for switchers and stayers
Figure (3.2) shows eleven bridges, indicated by red with names next to them, used by
subjects across the Mississippi River before and after the new bridge’s reopening. The
background is the TLG network (generated and maintained by Metropolitan Council
and The Lawrence Group) which encompasses the entire seven-county Minneapolis-St.
Paul Metropolitan Area.
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Figure 3.2: Bridges over the Mississippi River
Seventy-eight subjects made 2,167 morning commuting trips during the study period.
Most subjects use more than one bridge to cross the river. The bridge used by the most
trips is the “most frequently used bridge”.
Figure (3.3) illustrates trip distribution among bridges. Before the new bridge was
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built, Washington, 10th Avenue and I-94 are the three most used bridges in the sample.
After its reopening, the I-35W bridge is the main bridge carrying 64% of observed
cross-river trips in the sample.
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Figure 3.3: Cross-river trip distribution among bridges for study subjects
For 47 switchers, we further calculate the percentage of switchers who changed from
their frequently used bridges to the I-35W bridge. Switchers originally on the 10th
Avenue Bridge provide the highest portion of switching to the I-35W bridge and those
originally on the Washington Ave Bridge follows. This is reasonable because the 10th
Avenue Bridge and the Washington Ave Bridge are the nearest to the I-35W bridge.
We also compute the duration it took subjects to settle on a bridge after the reopen-
ing, i.e., from September 18, 2008 until the day when the subject have been taking the
most frequently used bridge for at least two times consecutively (Carrion and Levinson
2012). Zero day for switchers means they immediately use the new bridge on September
18, 2008; while zero day for stayers means they stick to their before-routes regardless
of the addition of the bridge. On average, it took 3.0 days for 78 subjects to sta-
bilize their bridge choices. The number of days for switchers to stabilize is slightly
longer than that for stayers and it has larger variation. Interested readers can refer to
Carrion and Levinson (2012) which employed duration analysis to analyze how many
days it took commuters to use the current bridge choice.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of duration of bridge stabilization
Mean Std Median Min Max
Switcher 3.2 6.0 0 0 27
Stayer 2.7 5.7 0 0 20
Total 3.0 5.8 0 0 27
3.4 Travel time saving calculation
In this study, we assume that travel time saving is the only stimulus for commuters to
switch to the new bridge disregard of travel time reliability and other factors.
To obtain the travel time savings brought by taking the new I-35W bridge, we need
to identify routes via the new bridge. For switchers, the after-route is the route via the
new bridge. Stayers, on the other hand, never use the new bridge and therefore a route
via I-35W bridge for each stayer should be ﬁrst identiﬁed.
The speed map was pooled from 6, 059 commuting trips out of 25, 157 total trips.
Only links with more than 5 observations before and after the new bridge’s reopening
were included. The average link speed was estimated from GPS data of all probe vehicles
passing this link during the experiment period. This map covers a high portion of the
freeway system and a fairly high portion of arterial roads, especially trunk highways
and downtown streets.
Based on the speed map, each link’s average travel time can be computed. Then
estimated travel times of a route is the sum of average travel times of all links along
that route. Consequently, the shortest paths via I-35W bridge is identiﬁed for stayers,
named “new-after-route”. Provided a new-after-route, the travel time saving for each
stayer can be estimated from the speed map.
Remark. Subjects’ commuting times are not the same, to make sure the following com-
parison is performed under the same benchmark, travel time saving proportion instead
of absolute travel time saving will be used. Denote (n) as the travel time saving pro-
portion by taking the new bridge for commuter n. It is computed as (n)= C
(n)
a −C(n)b
C
(n)
b
,
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where C
(n)
b , C
(n)
a are estimated travel times experienced by commuter n before and after
the reopening of the new bridge.
Table (3.3) summarizes the statistics of estimated travel time saving by using the
new bridge among switchers and stayers:
Table 3.3: Estimated time saving statistics
Statistics Switcher Stayer Total
Distribution
Counts 47 31 78
Percentage (%) 60.3 39.7 100.0
Average Travel Time
(minute)
Before 16.4 19.2 17.5
After 14.5 18.2 16.0
Diﬀerence 1.9 1.0 1.5
Average Travel Time
Saving Percentage (%)
Average 13.0 5.4 10.0
Minimum 2.6 0.4 0.4
Maximum 34.4 25.2 34.4
Median 10.5 3.5 7.9
3.5 Route switching analysis
3.5.1 Old-users and non-users
Subjects have diﬀerent time saving by taking the new bridge which varies from 2.6% to
34.4% for switchers and from 0.4% to 25.2% for stayers. This wide range of time saving
overlap between switchers and stayers results partially from drivers’ heterogeneity.
Among 78 subjects, 44 used the old I-35W bridge regularly before it collapsed and
34 were not the regular old bridge users. Old bridge users are pre-disposed to use
the new bridge while non-users may not use it even it could save substantial travel
time. Therefore, old-users and non-users should display diﬀerent route choice behavior
in response to the addition of the new bridge.
In the following, we will further divide switchers and stayers based on whether they
are “old-users” or “non-users”. Denote y as the indicator of stayer (i.e., y = 0) or
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switcher (i.e., y = 1) and U as the indicator of non-user (i.e., U = 0) or old-user
(i.e., U = 1). The frequency of stayers and switchers for non-users and old-users are
summarized in Table (3.4).
Table 3.4: Contingency table of subjects’ categories
Non-user (U=0) Old-user (U=1) Total
Stayer (y=0) 23 8 31
Switcher (y=1) 11 36 47
Total 34 44 78
Figure (3.4) illustrates the boxplot of estimated time saving proportion statistics
for two groups (non-user and old-user). The dots are data which are outside third
quartile and represent outliers. Overall the mean and the median travel time savings
for switchers are higher than those of stayers. The mean travel time savings for non-users
are slightly higher than those for old-users.
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Figure 3.4: Boxplot of travel time saving proportions
3.5.2 Factors contributing to route switching
The path set for traveler n, n = 1, · · · , 78 on day t before addition of the I-35W bridge
is Pnt. The chosen route for traveler n at time t is denoted as Ant = r. Assume at
time t+ 1, the I-35W bridge was rebuilt. The new route due to addition of the I-35W
bridge is r′nt. Accordingly, the new path set enlarged by addition of the I-35W bridge
is P˜nt = {P, r′nt}. Therefore, the probability of switching to the new route and the
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probability of staying on the current route are computed respectively as follows:
P (y(n) = 1) = P (An,t+1 = r
′
nt|Ant = rnt, Un), (3.5.1a)
P (y(n) = 0) = P (An,t+1 = rnt|Ant = rnt, Un). (3.5.1b)
where Un = 1 represents that commuter n is an old-user.
P (An,t+1 = r
′
nt|Ant = rnt, Un) depends on the time saving by taking the new route
r′nt and whether commuter n has used this bridge before. Assume the log ratio of
switching over staying is a linear function of time saving and commuter’s group, thus a
logit model is formulated:
log
P (y(n) = 1)
P (y(n) = 0)
= β0 + β1 ∗ log((n)) + β2Un, (3.5.2)
where β0, β1, β2 are regression coeﬃcients and need to be estimated from the data. We
use logarithm of time saving proportions here because time saving percentage varies
between 0% and 100% and rescaling will facilitate parameter estimation.
Given 78 subjects’ choices of switching or staying along with their characteristics, we
have {y1, · · · , y78} and the predictors are log((n)), n = 1, · · · , 78 and Un, n = 1, · · · , 78.
The likelihood function is: L =
∏78
n=1 P (y
(n) = 1)P (y(n) = 0). The maximum likelihood
method (i.e., logit regression) is conducted to estimate parameters β0, β1 and results are
as follows:
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 4.15 1.27 3.27 0.001 **
log() 1.85 0.48 3.828 0.000 ***
U 2.73 0.73 3.74 0.000 ***
** Statistically signiﬁcant at .5% level
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at .1% level
All three parameters are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 0.5% signiﬁcance level.
The goodness-of-ﬁt measure by using Chi Square test gives p-value of 1.9e− 5.
β1 = 1.85 indicates that the log ratio of switching versus staying, i.e., log
(
P (y=1)
P (y=0)
)
,
increases by 1.85 if there is one unit increase in the logarithm of time saving brought
by a new route. β2 = 2.73 indicates that the log ratio of switching versus staying for an
old-user is 2.73 times higher than that for a non-user.
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Given a certain time saving, old-users have higher probability of switching than
non-users. Therefore these two groups display diﬀerent route switching characteristics
in response to the addition of a new link.
3.6 Indiﬀerence band estimation
When the network topology remains the same for a long enough period of time, the traﬃc
ﬂow pattern stabilizes and therefore travelers’ route choice decisions are usually stable
(Zhu and Levinson 2012), implying that they do not switch. Major network disruptions
force travelers to search for new routes. Network restorations allow travelers to stay on
the old route or switch to new routes, without any requirement they change.
Several assumptions are made regarding boundedly rational route switching in this
analysis:
• The network stabilized at an equilibrium before the new bridge was rebuilt;
• A commuter will decide to switch to the new bridge based on the principle of
bounded rationality.
• A new equilibrium is reached at the end of our GPS study period.
For old-users and non-users, subjects have diﬀerent time saving ranges by taking
the new bridge. We divide this time saving range into I = 11 bins (i = 1, · · · , 11)
respectively. The total number of switchers and stayers for each bin can be calculated.
Figure (3.5) illustrates the distribution of switchers and stayers for each bin for old-
users. Figure (3.5a) show the frequencies within each bin. As the time saving increases,
generally speaking, the percentage of stayers gradually decreases to zero (with only one
outlier). Similar analysis can be applied to non-users shown in Figure (3.5b).
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Figure 3.5: Travel time saving distribution
If travel time were the only factor which impacting route choice, classical perfect
rationality cannot explain this phenomenon. Because if this were the case, everybody
should immediately switch as long as the time saving is greater than zero. This may
be caused by stickiness of the driving habit (Zhu and Levinson 2012). Therefore we
propose that travelers are boundedly rational in route switching. Accordingly a travel
time saving threshold, termed ‘indiﬀerence band’, is deﬁned to capture this driving
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inertia. The boundedly rational user equilibrium is reached when no traveler can reduce
his travel time by an indiﬀerence band by unilaterally changing routes.
3.6.1 Unsupervised learning
According to Figure (3.5), when time saving is higher than 10%, everybody tends to
use the new bridge (regardless of the outlier). Thus an estimate of the indiﬀerence band
for old-users is 10%. Accordingly, when the new bridge can save at least 10% travel
time, 17 out of 18 subjects (i.e., the number of old-users whose time saving is greater
than 10%) switched, which can capture behavioral change of 94% subjects. Similarly,
an estimate of the indiﬀerence band for non-users is 14%, meaning when the new bridge
saves at least 14% travel time, 4 out of 5 non-users switched and the estimation accuracy
is 80.0%.
This method belongs to unsupervised learning and its disadvantage is that outlier
is not considered.
3.6.2 Logit regression model formulation
In this section, we assume that the indiﬀerence band is a deterministic constant for
old-users and non-users respectively. However, commuters may not perceive travel time
accurately.
As indicated in the stimulus-response model, several biological experiments (Clark
1933; Hemmingsen 1933) veriﬁed that no response occurs unless the logarithm of stim-
ulus exceeds some threshold. In our context, the new bridge serves as a stimulus and
travelers decide to choose it or not in response. Therefore, the logarithm of time saving,
denoted as log((n)) will be adopted.
Travel time savings is estimated from GPS data and speed map. However, drivers
may perceive it with some error (Parthasarathi et al. 2013). Denote ˆ(n) as the loga-
rithm of commuter n’s perceived travel time saving, which is random:
ˆ(n) = β log((n)) + η, (3.6.1)
where η is a standard normal random variable, i.e., η ∼ N(0, 1) with cumulative distri-
bution function Φη(x).
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Commuters will not switch routes unless the logarithm of the perceived travel time
saving is greater than the logarithm of the indiﬀerence band, i.e.,
y(n) =
⎧⎨
⎩1, if ˆ
(n)
> log(ε∗);
0, if ˆ(n)  log(ε∗).
(3.6.2)
where,
y(n): a binary indicator for commuter n. It equals one if commuter n switches to the
new bridge and zero otherwise;
ε∗: the indiﬀerence band.
Therefore the probability of switching for commuter n is then computed as:
P (y(n) = 1| n, Un) = P (ˆ(n) > log(ε∗)| n, Un) = P (β log((n)) + η > log(ε∗)| n, Un)
= P (η > log(ε∗)− β log((n))| n, Un)
= 1− Φη(β0 + β1 log((n))) (3.6.3)
where β0 = log(ε
∗), β1 = −β.
Using probit regression, coeﬃcients are estimated separate for old-users and new-
users (Table 3.5):
Table 3.5: Probit regression coeﬃcients
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
Old-users
(Intercept) -2.42 1.00 -2.42 0.016 *
log() -1.08 0.38 -2.81 0.005 **
Non-users
(Intercept) -3.51 0.91 -3.84 0.000 ***
log() -0.92 0.30 -3.06 0.002 **
* Statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level
** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.1% level
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To illustrate, the mean indiﬀerence band for old-users is ε∗ = exp(−2.42) = 8.9%
with the 97.5% conﬁdence interval as [1.1%, 53.8%]. β1 = −1.08 indicates that the log
ratio of switching versus staying, i.e., log
(
P (y=1)
P (y=0)
)
, increases by 1.08 if there is one unit
increase in the logarithm of time saving brought by a new route.
Estimation
To estimate the number of switchers and stayers given , we divide the time saving
range (0 ∼ 35% for old-users and 0 ∼ 27% for non-users respectively) into bins with
1% increment, denoted as the jth bin (j = 1, · · · , 35 for old-users and j = 1, · · · , 27
for non-users). For each j, P (y(n) = 1| (n)j , Un) can be computed according to
Equation (3.6.3). The expected number of switchers for the jth bin can be computed
as:
Nˆ
(j)
switcher = N
(j)P (y = 1| =j, U) (3.6.4)
where,
N (j): the number of observations (i.e., switchers plus stayers) for the jth bin;
j: the critical time saving thresholds for the jth bin.
Note that we also divide the range into I = 11 bigger bins (each bin is denoted as
the ith bin) when we calculate frequencies of switchers and stayers in Figure (3.5). Then
we can aggregate the total expected number of switchers and stayers within the jth bin
for each ith, i = 1, · · · , 11 bin. Figures (3.6-3.7) illustrate frequency and cumulative
distribution of switchers and stayers from estimation and observation respectively.
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Figure 3.6: Frequency and cumulative distribution for old-users
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Figure 3.7: Frequency and cumulative distribution for non-users
Deﬁne the mean square error as MSE = 1N
I∑
i=1
(
Nˆ
(i)
switcher −N (i)switcher
)2
, where
Nˆ
(i)
switcher is the estimated number of switchers for the j
th bin and N
(i)
switcher is the
observed number of switchers, N is the total number of subjects. MSE is 17.4% for old-
users and 11.5% for non-users respectively. The estimated frequency and cumulative
percentage of switchers match the observed ones well and indicates that the proposed
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model can capture the switching pattern in data.
Chapter 4
Boundedly rational user
equilibrium (BRUE)
4.1 Introduction
When the BR assumption is used to model drivers’ route choice behavior, there are two
aspects regarding the boundedly rational route choice process. Some studies suggested
that travelers do not take the shortest paths because they are not capable of perceiv-
ing actual travel costs due to limited cognitive capacity, or it is too costly to search
information about all alternative paths (Gabaix et al. 2006; Gao et al. 2011).
On the other hand, some studies assumed that all path cost information is available
to travelers through some information system, but they will not switch to shorter
paths due to existence of inertia, which was quantiﬁed by a term named ‘indiﬀerence
band’ (Mahmassani and Chang 1987). A series of experiments were conducted by
Mahmassani and his colleges to validate this BR behavioral assumption and cal-
ibrate values of indiﬀerence bands (Hu and Mahmassani 1997; Jayakrishnan et al.
1994a; Mahmassani and Chang 1987; Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan 1991;
Mahmassani and Liu 1999; Srinivasan and Mahmassani 1999). These experiments were
conducted on an interactive simulator-DYNASMART, incorporating pre-trip departure
time, route choices and en-route path switching decisions. Subjects, as travelers, could
change paths en-route at each node and also adjust their departure-time choices the
next day based on previous days’ travel experiences. Travelers were assumed to follow
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the BR behavioral rule in decision-making processes, i.e., they would only switch
routes when improved trip time exceeded some indiﬀerence bands. The values of these
indiﬀerence bands depended on individual characteristics and network performances.
Lu and Mahmassani (2008) further studied the impact of congestion pricing on drivers’
behavior within the boundedly rational behavioral framework.
In this chapter, we assume that travelers can perceive travel costs accurately but
some indiﬀerence bands exist due to inertia to switch routes. When traﬃc ﬂow patterns
stabilize to some equilibrium, called ‘boundedly rational user equilibrium’ (BRUE),
travelers can take any route whose travel time is within an indiﬀerence band of the
shortest path cost (Guo and Liu 2011; Lou et al. 2010). Indiﬀerence bands vary among
origin-destination (OD) pairs. By introducing one parameter (i.e., indiﬀerence band) for
each OD pair, the BR framework relaxes the restrictive PR assumption that travelers
only take the shortest paths at equilibrium.
According to Ben-Akiva et al. (1984), travelers’ route choice behavior is regarded as
a two-stage process: path set generation (i.e., a path choice set is generated between
origin and destination according to route characteristics) and traﬃc assignment (i.e.,
traﬃc demands are mapped to these generated paths based on certain traﬃc assignment
criteria). Accordingly, we will ﬁrst study how to generate boundedly rational path sets
ﬁrst and then assign traﬃc demands to these paths based on BRUE conditions. The
BRUE solution set is constructed by using networks with ﬁxed demand. Obtaining the
BRUE solution set and exploring fundamental mathematical properties of BRUE will
serve as a building block for BRUE related applications, such as BR-related congestion
pricing and other network design problems.
Following the two-stage route choice process, the rest of the chapter is organized
as follows: In Section 4.2, the ε-BRUE is deﬁned and formulated as a nonlinear com-
plementarity problem (NCP). In Section 4.3, a BRUE-related acceptable path set is
deﬁned and its structure is studied. In Section 4.4, how to obtain acceptable path set is
presented. In Section 4.5, we will construct BRUE path ﬂow solution set based on the
acceptable path set. Some examples are given to illustrate structure of the BRUE path
ﬂow solution set.
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4.2 Deﬁnition of ε-BRUE and nonlinear complementarity
formulation
The traﬃc network is represented by a directed graph that includes a set of consecutively
numbered nodes, N , and a set of consecutively numbered links, L. Let W denote the
origin-destination (OD) pair set connected by a set of simple paths (composed of a
sequence of distinct nodes), Pw, through the network. The traﬃc demand for OD pair
w is dw. Let fwi denote the ﬂow on path i ∈ Pw for OD pair w, then the path ﬂow vector
is f = {fwi }w∈Wi∈Pw . The feasible path ﬂow set is to assign the traﬃc demand on the feasible
paths: F  {f : f  0, ∑
i∈P
fwi = d
w,∀w ∈ W}. Denote xa as the link ﬂow on link a,
then the link ﬂow vector is x = {xa}a∈L. Each link a ∈ L is assigned a cost function of
the link ﬂow, written as c(x). Let δwa,i = 1 if link a is on path i connecting OD pair w,
and 0 if not; then Δ  {δwa,i}w∈Wa∈L,i∈P , denotes the link-path incidence matrix. Therefore
fwi =
∑
a
δwa,ixa, and it can be rewritten in a vector form as x = Δf . Denote C
w
i (f) as
the path cost on path i for OD pair w, then the path cost vector C(f)  {Cwi (f)}w∈Wi∈P .
So C(f) = ΔT c(x) under the additive path cost assumption.
In this chapter, we assume the link cost is separable, continuous and linear with
respect to its own link ﬂow, i.e., c(x) = Hx, where H is the Jacobian matrix of the link
cost. Then the path cost can be computed as: C(f) = ΔT c(x) = ΔTHΔf  Af , where
A = ΔTHΔ.
4.2.1 Deﬁnition
Mahmassani and Chang (1987) deﬁned a BRUE ﬂow vector as the one ‘whenever all
users’ perceived travel costs on their selected routes are constrained within their respec-
tive indiﬀerence bands’. Following this line, we deﬁne ε-BRUE as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.2.1. For a given nonnegative vector ε = (εw)w∈W , εw  0, a feasible path
ﬂow vector f ∈ F is said to be a ε-boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE) path
ﬂow pattern, denoted by f εBRUE , if
fwi > 0 ⇒ Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,∀i ∈ P,∀w ∈ W (4.2.1)
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This deﬁnition says that, for a one path ﬂow pattern which is a boundedly rational
user equilibrium, travelers only pick any route that is within a given indiﬀerence band
ε of the shortest path.
Remark. • Equation (4.2.1) gives a necessary condition judging whether a ﬂow pat-
tern is BRUE, and is equivalent to the following condition:
Cwi (f) > min
j∈Pw
Cwj (f) + ε
w ⇒ fwi = 0,
But the inverse is not always true:
fwi = 0  C
w
i (f) > min
j∈Pw
Cwj (f) + ε
w.
In other words, an unused path may have lower cost than a used one, which will
never happen in the UE setting. Therefore, if Cwi (f)  min
j∈Pw
Cwj (f) + ε
w, then
fwi  0.
• When ε = 0, the BRUE deﬁnition is reduced to:
F0BRUE  FUE = {f ∈ F : fwi > 0 ⇒ Cwi (f) = min
j∈P
Cwj (f),∀i ∈ P,∀w ∈ W};
(4.2.2)
The path ﬂow set satisfying the above deﬁnition is called the UE path ﬂow set.
Based on the UE path ﬂow set FUE , the UE shortest path set PUE can be deﬁned
as:
PUE = {i ∈ P : Cwi (f) = min
j∈P
Cwj (f),∀f ∈ FUE}. (4.2.3)
We should note that the UE shortest path from PUE may carry ﬂow or may have
no ﬂow on it.
• Some literature (Mahmassani and Chang 1987; Mahmassani and Stephan 1988;
Mahmassani and Liu 1999) assumed that the indiﬀerence band is a relative value
instead of an absolute value adopted here: the cost diﬀerence between cost of the
utilized path and that of the shortest path is within a fraction of the shortest cost.
Though the indiﬀerence band is presented diﬀerently in the above literature, the
methodologies of constructing the BRUE set remain the same.
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Usually the ε-BRUE is non-unique. Denote a set containing all path ﬂow patterns
satisfying Deﬁnition (4.2.1) as the ε-BRUE path ﬂow solution set:
FεBRUE  {f ∈ F : fwi > 0 ⇒ Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,∀i ∈ P,∀w ∈ W}; (4.2.4)
Proposition 4.2.1. If the link cost function is continuous, the ε-BRUE solution (ε  0)
is non-empty.
Proof. First, Patriksson (1994) showed that, when the link cost function is continuous,
UE exists.
Let f ∈ FUE be the UE path ﬂow pattern, when ε  0,
fwi > 0 ⇒ Cwi (f) = min
j∈P
Cwj (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,∀i ∈ P,∀w ∈ W
So f is also a ε-BRUE (ε  0), i.e., f ∈ FεBRUE . Then FUE ⊆ FεBRUE . In other
words, UE must be contained in the BRUE set. Given the continuous link cost function,
at least one BRUE ﬂow pattern exists, and therefore FεBRUE = ∅.
Note. FUE may be non-unique if the link cost function is not strictly monotone. In
spite of its non-uniqueness, it is still contained in the ε-BRUE set.
4.2.2 BRUE-NCP formulation
Given the continuous link cost function, the ε-BRUE must exist. The next question
is, how we can compute equilibrium solutions. Since UE is a special case of BRUE, we
will start with UE. Based on the Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle, UE can be solved from a
nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP). For all i ∈ Pw and all w ∈ W:
0  fwi ⊥ Cwi (f)− πw  0, (4.2.5a)
0  πw ⊥ dw −
∑
i∈P
fwi  0. (4.2.5b)
where πw is the shortest path cost for tOD pair w. ⊥ is the orthogonal sign representing
the inner product of two vectors is zero.
Similarly, BRUE can be formulated as a NCP as well, but some changes should be
made.
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Proposition 4.2.2 (BRUE NCP). Given εw(w ∈ W), and some ρ = (ρwi )wi , where
0  ρwi  εw. A feasible path ﬂow vector f ∈ F is a ε-BRUE path ﬂow pattern if and
only if it solves the following NCP, ∀i ∈ Pw,∀w ∈ W:
(NCP(ρ)) 0  fwi ⊥ Cwi (f) + ρwi − πw  0, (4.2.6a)
0  πw ⊥ dw −
∑
i∈P
fwi  0. (4.2.6b)
where the physical meaning of πw is the maximum path cost within the band εw for OD
pair w.
Proof. In the ﬁxed-demand case, (4.2.6b) is reduced to the nonnegative constraint on
πw  0.
(1) To prove the necessary part, let f be a feasible ﬂow pattern and let (ρ,π) be a
pair such that Equation (4.2.6) holds, then 0  ρ  ε, πw  0 for all w ∈ W and i ∈ Pw.
Moreover, Cwi (f) + ρ
w
i − πw  0 and 0  ρwi  εw indicate that
πw  Cwi (f) + ρwi  Cwi (f) + εw,
thus,
πw  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w.
For fwi > 0, (4.2.6a) holds iﬀ C
w
i (f) + ρ
w
i − πw = 0, i.e.,
fwi > 0 ⇒ Cwi (f) = πw − ρwi  πw  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,
which satisﬁes Deﬁnition (4.2.1), so f is a ε-BRUE path ﬂow pattern.
(2) To prove the suﬃcient part, suppose f is a BRUE ﬂow pattern. For i ∈ Pw and
w ∈ W , deﬁne
πw  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w  0. (4.2.7)
and
ρwi 
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
πw − Cwi (f), if Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w;
0, if Cwi (f) > min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w;
(4.2.8)
Equation (4.2.6) holds automatically for any BRUE ﬂow pattern. It suﬃces to
show that 0  ρwi  εw, πw  0. Since f is a BRUE ﬂow pattern, it follows that, by
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Deﬁnition (4.2.1), if fwi  0, Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f)+ ε
w; if Cwi (f) > min
j∈P
Cwj (f)+ ε
w, then
fwi = 0.
When fwi  0, then Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,
Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w = πw,
which yields ρwi  0 from (4.2.8). Again, by (4.2.8),
ρwi = π
w − Cwi (f) = min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w − Cwi (f)  εw,
showing that ρwi  εw. So 0  ρwi  εw if fwi > 0.
When Cwi (f) > min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w, i.e., fwi = 0, then ρ
w
i = 0 by (4.2.8).
In summary, 0  ρwi  εw and πw  0 for i ∈ Pw and w ∈ W .
Remark. • Comparing the UE-NCP with the BRUE-NCP formulation, there is one
additional term ρwi in BRUE-NCP, we call it ‘indiﬀerence function.’ If C
w
i (f) 
min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w, then ρwi = 0; if C
w
i (f) = min
j∈P
Cwj (f), then ρ
w
i = ε
w.
• The meaning of πw is diﬀerent in the two settings. Regarding UE, πw is the
shortest travel time; while in BRUE, its value is equal to the shortest travel cost
plus εw (see Equation (4.2.7)). πw is a function of the ﬂow pattern, so we call it
the ‘maximum path cost’ for a speciﬁc BRUE ﬂow pattern. For some ﬂow pattern,
there may not exist a path with the exact cost of πw. If some ﬂow pattern happens
to have a path with the cost of πw, this path may or may not carry ﬂows.
From BRUE NCP (4.2.6) and its proof, we have another conclusion:
Corollary 1. If f ∈ FεBRUE , there must exist at least one vector pair (ρ,π) satisfying
NCP (4.2.6). Moreover, one value of (ρ,π) is determined by (4.2.7) and (4.2.8).
By substituting one indiﬀerence function ρ ∈ Rn+ into the BRUE-NCP, one BRUE
path ﬂow pattern can be obtained. The BRUE-NCP formulation provides an approach
of solving one BRUE solution. In the following we will show how to construct complete
BRUE solution sets out of a speciﬁc solution.
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4.3 Monotonically non-decreasing acceptable path set
In the last section, we show that when the indiﬀerence band is zero, BRUE is equivalent
to UE ﬂow pattern and travelers will only take shortest paths. When the indiﬀer-
ence band gradually increases, some paths which are too costly to take under UE may
be utilized under BRUE. In this section, we will discuss the relationship between the
indiﬀerence band and the number of utilized paths.
4.3.1 Monotonically non-decreasing property
All feasible paths for one particular BRUE ﬂow pattern can be classiﬁed into three
categories:
Deﬁnition 4.3.1. Given a ε-BRUE ﬂow pattern f ∈ FεBRUE , the total feasible paths
could have three statuses: acceptable, zero-acceptable and unacceptable. The accept-
able path carries ﬂow while its cost is within the shortest one plus a band; the zero-
acceptable path is acceptable in terms of the cost but carries no ﬂow; and the unaccept-
able path is longer than the shortest cost plus the band.
aε(f) = {i ∈ P : fi > 0, Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,∀w}; (4.3.1a)
0ε(f) = {i ∈ P : fi = 0, Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,∀w}; (4.3.1b)
uε(f) = {i ∈ P : fi = 0, Cwi (f) > min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w,∀w}. (4.3.1c)
There are three properties of the above three path sets:
Proposition 4.3.1. (1) Given one BRUE ﬂow pattern f , the union of paths at these
three status is the feasible path set: aε(f) ∪ 0ε(f) ∪ uε(f) = P;
(2) Given one BRUE ﬂow pattern f , we can always ﬁnd at least one path which is
acceptable or zero-acceptable: aε(f) ∪ 0ε(f) = ∅;
(3) Given one BRUE ﬂow pattern f , if ε  maxj∈P Cwj (f)−minj∈P Cwj (f), all feasible
paths are either acceptable or zero-acceptable: uε(f) = ∅.
Proof. (1) It is obvious from the deﬁnition.
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(2) Since the shortest path i = argminj∈P Cwj (f) always exists, so i ∈ aε(f)∪0ε(f) ⊆
P.
(3) maxj∈P Cwj (f) −minj∈P Cwj (f)  ε implies Cwi (f)  minj∈P Cwj (f) + ε,∀i ∈ P,
thus no path is unacceptable, i.e., uε(f) = ∅.
Deﬁnition (4.3.1) divides all the feasible paths for one BRUE ﬂow pattern into three
classes. Each status notation indicates dependency of path status on ε and a speciﬁc
BRUE ﬂow pattern. The following proposition will discuss the relationship between the
path status and the value of ε.
Proposition 4.3.2. Given f ∈ FεBRUE , if 0  ε < ε′, then aε(f) ⊆ aε
′
(f), 0ε(f) ⊆ 0ε′(f).
Proof. It suﬃces to show that, if an arbitrary path i is acceptable or zero-acceptable un-
der the indiﬀerence band ε, it is also acceptable or zero-acceptable when the indiﬀerence
band is ε′ > ε. ∀i ∈ aε(f), we know fi > 0, and
Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
w < min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
′
=⇒ i ∈ aε′(f).
Therefore aε(f) ⊆ aε′(f). Similarly 0ε(f) ⊆ 0ε′(f).
Proposition (4.3.2) says that, for a ε-BRUE ﬂow pattern, the status of a path depends
on the value of ε. Since its total feasible paths are ﬁxed, those unused paths under
smaller ε can be utilized with bigger ε. Therefore, the bigger ε is, the more paths are
acceptable or zero-acceptable, and the less paths are unacceptable.
In the following, we will discuss the impact of the value of ε on the size of the
ε-BRUE ﬂow set.
Proposition 4.3.3 (Monotonically non-decreasing ﬂow set). If 0  ε < ε′, then
FεBRUE ⊆ Fε
′
BRUE .
Proof. It suﬃces to show that ∀f ∈ FεBRUE =⇒ f ∈ Fε
′
BRUE .
∀f ∈ FεBRUE =⇒ {fwi > 0 ⇒ Cwi (f)  min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
< min
j∈P
Cwj (f) + ε
′
,∀i ∈ P,∀w ∈ W}
=⇒ f ∈ Fε
′
BRUE =⇒ FεBRUE ⊆ Fε
′
BRUE .
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Proposition (4.3.3) indicates that when ε increases, more ﬂow patterns will be in-
cluded in the ε-BRUE ﬂow set.
When the ε-BRUE ﬂow set exists and is non-unique, each ﬂow pattern has dif-
ferent combination of acceptable, zero-acceptable and unacceptable paths. A ‘largest
ε-acceptable path set’ contains all acceptable paths for every ﬂow pattern in the ε-BRUE
ﬂow set, mathematically:
Pεl =
⋃
f∈FεBRUE
aε(f). (4.3.2)
The largest ε-acceptable path set shares the similar property as the ε-BRUE ﬂow set
has:
Proposition 4.3.4 (Monotonically non-decreasing path set). If 0  ε < ε′,
Pεl ⊆ Pε
′
l , where Pεl is deﬁned in (4.3.2).
Proof.
Pεl =
⋃
f∈FεBRUE
aε(f) ⊆
⋃
f∈Fε′BRUE
aε(f) (Proposition (4.3.3))
⊆
⋃
f∈Fε′BRUE
aε
′
(f) (Proposition (4.3.2)) = Pε′l .
When ε varies from zero to inﬁnity, the minimum number of paths the largest ε-
acceptable path set contains is the UE shortest paths when ε = 0, i.e., P0BRUE  PUE .
The maximum number of paths the largest ε-acceptable path set contains is all feasible
paths, meaning all feasible paths will be utilized if the indiﬀerence band is too large.
Then we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. PUE ⊆ Pεl ⊆ P.
Given ε, the largest ε-acceptable path set (deﬁned in Equation (4.3.2)) is a set of
all acceptable paths under the ε-BRUE set. It is possible that some acceptable paths
for one ε-BRUE ﬂow pattern are not acceptable for other ﬂow patterns; vice versa.
This necessitates the exploration of the interior structure of the ε-acceptable path set.
Proposition (4.3.4) provides us with one approach of analyzing its structure by varying
values of ε.
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The path set is a set of ﬁnite paths, while ε is treated as a continuous parameter
for the time being. Starting with the UE path set when ε = 0, provided the topology
of a network and the link cost functions, PUE can be determined by some established
algorithms, e.g., column generation algorithm (Patriksson 1994), gradient projection
algorithm (Jayakrishnan et al. 1994b), or maximum entropy algorithm (Bell and Iida
1997). According to Proposition (4.3.4), when ε is gradually increased, more paths will
be included. We should be able to identify those acceptable paths one by one until all
alternative paths are included. This oﬀers theoretical foundation for deriving diﬀerent
combinations of acceptable paths by varying ε subsequently.
4.3.2 Deﬁnition of ε-acceptable path set
It is assumed that there are n alternative paths for OD pair w, i.e., P = {1, · · · , n}
and |P| = n, where |P| is the cardinality of set P. Among these n paths, there are p
shortest paths at the UE, i.e., PUE = {1, · · · , p} and |PUE | = p  n.
Deﬁnition 4.3.2. Assuming there exists a unique sequence of ﬁnite critical points
ε∗wj , (j = 1, · · · , J), with ε∗0 = 0, ε∗J+1 = ∞, dividing the nonnegative real line into
(J + 1) intervals: [0,∞) = [0, ε∗1) ∪ [ε∗1, ε∗2) · · · ∪ [ε∗J ,∞) =
⋃J
j=0[ε
∗
j , ε
∗
j+1). A sequence of
critical points are deﬁned as:
ε∗1  inf
ε>0
{PUE ⊂ Pεl };
...
ε∗j  inf
ε>0
{Pε
∗
j−1
l ⊂ Pεl }; (4.3.3)
...
ε∗J  inf
ε>0
{Pεl = P}.
The largest ε-acceptable path set will remain the same until ε reaches these values, i.e.,
for ε∗j  ε1 < ε2 < ε∗j+1, P
ε∗j
l = Pε1l = Pε2l ⊂ P
ε∗j+1
l .
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Figure 4.1: Monotonically non-decreasing property illustration
A ‘newly added path’ is deﬁned as the path which is unacceptable under ε∗j−1 but
acceptable when ε = ε∗j :
r∗j  {i ∈ P : i ∈ P
ε∗j
l , i /∈ P
ε∗j−1
l }, (4.3.4)
Given the current acceptable path set Pε
∗
j−1
l , after newly acceptable paths are identiﬁed,
the updated acceptable path set is:
Pε
∗
j
l  P
ε∗j−1
l
⋃
r∗j . (4.3.5)
Remark. There may exist two or more paths added at the same time, so r∗j should be
treated as a path set.
Provided a ﬁxed indiﬀerence band ε, ε∗I  ε < ε∗I+1. Let K = min{I, J}. The
ε-acceptable path set is deﬁned as:
Pε = {PUE ,Pε
∗
1
l , · · · ,P
ε∗K
l }. (4.3.6)
In other words, the ε-acceptable path set is composed of K acceptable path sets with
PUE ⊂ Pε
∗
1
l ⊂ · · · ⊂ P
ε∗K
l ⊆ P.
4.4 Generation of the ε-acceptable path set
In the last section, we introduced a BR-related path set: the largest ε-acceptable path
set. In this section, we will explore how to generate this path set. Deﬁnition (4.3.3) says
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that, the largest ε-acceptable path set includes more paths when ε increases to some
critical values. Thus, a mathematical program with equilibrium constraint (MPEC) can
be developed to solve these critical values:
(MPEC) min εj
s.t.
0  fi ⊥ Ci(f) + ρi − π  0,∀i ∈ P, (4.4.1a)∑
r∈P
fr = d, (4.4.1b)
d−
∑
j∈P
ε∗
j−1
l
fj > 0, (4.4.1c)
0  ρi  εj ,∀i ∈ P, (4.4.1d)
fi + Ci(f) + ρi − π > 0,∀i ∈ P. (4.4.1e)
(4.4.1a-4.4.1b) is to guarantee that the path ﬂow pattern is a feasible BRUE; (4.4.1c)
tries to push a small amount of ﬂow from the acceptable path set Pε
∗
j−1
l to some newly
acceptable path if ε is increased a little bit; (4.4.1d) sets bounds for the indiﬀerence func-
tion; (4.4.1e) ensures strict complementarity condition in (4.4.1a) (Cottle et al. 2009).
If MPEC (4.4.1) is solvable, optimal solutions (f∗,ρ∗, π∗, ε∗j ) will be obtained. The
newly added path r∗j can be derived from f
∗. It is the path that is excluded from Pε
∗
j−1
l
but begins to carry a very small amount of ﬂow in f∗.
(4.4.1c) and (4.4.1e) are inequalities without equal sign, which deﬁnes an open set
causing non-attainability of the optimal solution. So we introduce a parameter 0 < δ  1
such that d− ∑
r∈P
ε∗
j−1
l
fr  δd and fi +Ci(f) + ρi − π  δ. We call this modiﬁed version
as ’δ-MPEC’, and we will solve this version in practice by giving δ a very small value
84
(δ = 0.01 works well). Rewrite the δ-MPEC in a compact form:
(δ-MPEC) min εj
s.t. 1T f = d, (4.4.2a)
− vT f  (δ − 1)d, (4.4.2b)
εj1− ρ  0, (4.4.2c)
f + C(f) + ρ− π  δ, (4.4.2d)
ρ, π, εj  0, (4.4.2e)
f  0, (4.4.2f)
C(f) + ρ− π1  0, (4.4.2g)
fT (C(f) + fTρ− π1) = 0. (4.4.2h)
where v is an vector of the same dimension with the path ﬂow vector, with the ith
component equal to one if fi ∈ Pε
∗
j−1 and zero otherwise. 1 is a vector of 1.
In practice, this MPEC problem can be solved by GAMS software (General Algebraic
Modeling System, see Rosenthal and Brooke 2007).
4.4.1 Solving critical points sequentially
When ε∗1 is achieved, we include the corresponding path r
∗
1 into the UE shortest path set
and get Pε∗1l . Next we are interested in ﬁnding the critical point ε∗2 based on current P
ε∗1
l .
We can solve the above MPEC again by replacing Pε∗1l in (4.4.1b) with P
ε∗2
l , and ε
∗
2 will
be obtained. Similarly, ε∗3, · · · , are able to be computed sequentially. This procedure
will not stop until all feasible paths are included into the BRUE acceptable set or the
critical value reaches the given ε.
The above procedure provides a method of obtaining the critical points and the order
of adding new paths to the acceptable path sets. We will illustrate how to implement
this procedure on a small network in the following.
Example 4.4.1. A four-link network connects one OD pair in parallel with demand 2.
The link cost for each link is 1, x2 + 1.5, x3 + 3, x4 + 3. The UE is x1 = 2, x2 = x3 =
x4 = 0. Four paths are numbered as path 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 4.2: Single-OD pair network illustration
Solving MPEC, we have ε∗0 = 0, ε
∗
1 = 0.5, ε
∗
2 = 2, ε
∗
3 = ∞. There are three cases for
the largest ε-acceptable path sets:
(1) 0  ε < 0.5: Pεl = {1}, f = [2, 0, 0, 0];
(2) 0.5  ε < 2: Pεl = {1, 2}, f = [2, 0, 0, 0];
(4) ε  2: Pεl = {1, 2, 3, 4}, f = [2, 0, 0, 0].
If ε is calibrated from empirical data as 1.5, then P1.5l = {1, 2}. Therefore, P1.5 =
{{1}{1, 2}}.
4.4.2 ε-acceptable path set for multiple OD pairs
For a network with total W OD pairs, let ε∗wj be the critical point for OD pair w ∈ W,
j = 0, 1, · · · , Jw. Then ε∗j 
{
ε∗wj
}
is a set of critical points for all OD pairs, assuming
ε∗w0 = 0, w ∈ W.
Given ε = (ε1, · · · , εW ), if ε1nK1  ε
1 < ε1nK1+1
, · · · , εWnKW  ε
W < εWnKW+1
, then the
largest ε-acceptable set for multiple OD pairs is the union of the largest ε-acceptable
set for each OD path pair:
Pεl = P(ε
1,··· ,εw,··· ,εW )
l = P
ε∗1nK1
l
⋃
· · ·
⋃
P
ε∗WnKW
l . (4.4.3)
where Pε
∗w
nKw
l is the largest ε
∗w
nKw
-acceptable set for OD pair w and can be solved by
MPEC (4.4.1).
The ε-acceptable path set is composed of multiple largest ε∗wnKw -acceptable sets when
varying ε∗wj among every critical point across all OD pairs:
Pε = P(ε1,··· ,εw,··· ,εW ) =
{
P(ε
1,··· ,ε∗wj ,··· ,εW )
l
}
ε∗wj
, w ∈ W, j = 0, 1, · · · , Jw. (4.4.4)
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Now we will discuss how to solve each critical point for every OD pair. Regarding one
OD pair ν ∈ W, the same approach of computing ε∗νj as mentioned in Equation (4.4.1)
can be adopted. The only diﬀerence is, to compute path costs needs the information of
path ﬂows across all OD pairs. So path ﬂows fw, w ∈ W, w = ν are parameters when
Equation (4.4.1) for ν is calculated. In other words, ε∗νj is a function of f
w, w = ν. But
we only want those fw, w = ν such that ε∗νj which can be achieved. So accordingly, we
modify Equation (4.4.1) to accommodate this distinction. For any OD pair ν and the
jth, j = 1, · · · , Jw the critical point ενj can be computed as:
min ενj
s.t.
0  f νi ⊥ Cνi (f) + ρνi − πν  0,∀i ∈ Pν , (4.4.5a)∑
j∈Pw
fwj = d
w,∀w ∈ W, (4.4.5b)
dν −
∑
j∈P
ε∗ν
j−1
l
f νj > 0, (4.4.5c)
0  ρνi  ενj ,∀i ∈ Pν , (4.4.5d)
0  f νi + Cνi (f) + ρνi − πν > 0,∀i ∈ Pν . (4.4.5e)
The algorithm of calculating ε-acceptable path set for multiple OD pairs is thus
summarized as follows:
1. Calculate ε∗νj (j = 1, · · · , Jw, ν ∈ W) from Equation (4.4.5) and obtain the εν -
acceptable path set for OD pair ν;
2. As a by-product of solving Equation (4.4.5), one feasible path ﬂow pattern
f∗w, w = ν is attained simultaneously. Denote the longest used path for OD pair
w,∀w = ν as pw :=
{
max
j∈Pw
Cwj (f), f
w
i > 0
}
and compute Cwp (f). Then the i
th(i =
1, · · · , Jw) critical point for OD pair w is computed as: ε∗wi = Cwp (f)− min
j∈Pw
Cwj (f);
3. After obtaining the critical points ε∗wi (i = 1, · · · , Jw, w = ν), if ε∗wi−1 < Cwp (f) −
min
j∈Pw
Cwj (f) < ε
∗w
i , f
∗w(w = ν) is also a BRUE path ﬂow pattern. Then the path
pw is acceptable when ενj < ε
∗ν
j and ε
w
i < ε
∗w
i ; or else path p
w is unacceptable;
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4. Combine the acceptable paths under various combinations of critical points among
all OD pairs and the ε-acceptable path set Pε is obtained.
The following example will illustrate how to construct the ε-acceptable path set for
multiple OD pairs.
Example 4.4.2. The topology of the test network, two OD demands and link cost
functions are illustrated above each link in Figure (4.3). Red curves on the right indicate
six paths, denoted by the number of links it passes along: 1-3, 1-4, 2-3, 2-4, 1, 2. The ﬁrst
four paths belong to OD pair 1 and the rest two belong to OD pair 2. The equilibrium
path ﬂow pattern is f1 = 0, f2 = 1, f3 = 0, f4 = 0, f5 = 1, f6 = 0.
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Figure 4.3: Two-OD pair network and paths illustration
Based on Equation (4.4.5), ε∗11 , ε∗12 and ε∗21 can be computed separately. The critical
points for each OD pair are:
For OD pair 1,
(1) 0  ε1 < 4: Pε1 = {2};
(2) 4  ε1 < 8: Pε1 = {{2}, {1, 2}};
(2) 8  ε1 < 12: Pε1 = {{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 4}};
(3) ε1  12: Pε1 = {{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
For OD pair 2,
(1) 0  ε2 < 8: Pε2 = {5};
(2) ε2  8: Pε2 = {{5}, {5, 6}};
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Combing two OD pairs, the overall ε-acceptable path set under diﬀerent combination
of critical points is:
Pε =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{2, 5}, 0  ε1  4, 0  ε2  8;
{{2, 5}, {2, 5, 6}}, 0  ε1  4, ε2  8;
{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}}, 4  ε1  8, 0  ε2  8;
{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {2, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 5, 6}}, 4  ε1  8, ε2  8;
{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}}, 8  ε1  12, 0  ε2  8;
{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}, {2, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 4, 5, 6}}, 8  ε1  12, ε2  8;
{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}, ε1  12, 0  ε2  8;
{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}, {2, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 5, 6},
{1, 2, 4, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}}, ε1  12, ε2  8.
(4.4.6)
All acceptable path sets are also illustrated in the following ﬁgure: numbers in each
block display acceptable path numbers for certain (ε1,ε2) pair. The left bottom block
for (ε1 < 4,ε2 < 8) is the UE shortest path set. How to get acceptable paths for
(ε1  4,ε2 < 8) in the block to its right will be explained in the following and other
blocks follow the same line of reason. As described above in steps (2) and (3), one path
ﬂow pattern f1 = 0.001, f2 = 0.9999, f3 = 0, f4 = 0, f5 = 1, f6 = 1 is attained when
ε1 = 4 is solved from Equation (4.4.5). For OD pair 1, its path ﬂow increases from 0
to a positive number 0.001, meaning that path 1 will start to carry ﬂows if ε1 > 4; the
utilized path 5 has the cost of 2 and the unused path 6 has the cost of 10. Their cost
diﬀerence is 8. When ε2 < 8, only path 5 is acceptable for OD pair 2. Therefore, when
ε1  4 and ε2 < 8, only paths 1,2 (connecting OD pair 1) and 5 (connecting OD pair
2) are acceptable.
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Figure 4.4: Acceptable paths for critical point pairs (ε1,ε2)
By far we have proposed how to solve the ε-acceptable path set for both single
OD pair and multiple OD pairs. In the following we will discuss the methodology of
constructing the ε-BRUE path ﬂow set.
4.5 Construction of ε-BRUE path ﬂow set
Generally the ε-BRUE set is non-convex (Lou et al. 2010), so it is not easy to construct
it directly. If we can decompose the whole BRUE set into small subsets, which are easier
to study, then constructing the whole set can be reduced to constructing each subset.
Based on this idea, the key step is to explore the interior structure of the ε-BRUE set
and identify these simpler subsets.
In Section (4.4), we analyze the interior structure of the ε-acceptable path set: as the
indiﬀerence band gradually increases, more paths will begin to carry ﬂows. Correspond-
ingly, the ε-BRUE set can be decomposed into subsets as well, with only acceptable
paths carrying ﬂows for each subset. Denote the kth subset as Fεk and K as the total
number of largest ε-acceptable path sets. Mathematically, FεBRUE is the union of K+1
disjoint subsets:
Fεi
⋂
Fεj = ∅, i, j = 0, · · · ,K, i = j; (4.5.1a)
FεBRUE =
K⋃
k=0
Fεk . (4.5.1b)
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According to the largest acceptable path set deﬁned in Equation (4.3.2), the kth
ε-BRUE path ﬂow subset is deﬁned as:
Fε0 = {f ∈ FεBRUE : aε(f) ⊆ PUE},
Fεk = {f ∈ FεBRUE : P
ε∗k−1
l ⊂ aε(f) ⊆ P
ε∗k
l }, k = 1, · · · ,K. (4.5.2)
where Pε∗kl is the largest ε∗k-acceptable path set deﬁned in (4.3.5).
4.5.1 ε-BRUE path ﬂow set for one OD pair
Equation (4.5.2) deﬁnes the kth subset of the ε-BRUE path ﬂow set. In this section,
we will explore how to construct each subset. By deﬁning a sequence of sets Sεk, k =
0, · · · ,K and assigning all travel demands to paths from the associated largest path set,
we get:
Sε0  {f ∈ F : ∀ i ∈ PUE : fi, fj  0, |Ci(f)− Cj(f)| ε;
∀ i ∈ PUE : fi = 0}.
Sεk  {f ∈ F : ∀ i ∈ P
ε∗k−1
l : fi  0;∃i ∈ P
ε∗k
l \P
ε∗k−1
l : fi > 0; (4.5.3)
∀ i, j ∈ Pε∗kl : |Ci(f)− Cj(f)| ε;
∀ i ∈ Pε∗kl : fi = 0}, k = 1, · · · ,K.
where Pε∗kl is deﬁned in (4.3.5).
The set Sε0 contains all feasible path ﬂow patterns where only the UE shortest paths
carry ﬂows and the cost diﬀerence between any two shortest paths are within the band
ε. For the set Sεk, k = 1, · · · ,K, there are two types of paths: the newly acceptable
paths will carry ﬂows and those belonging to the ε∗k−1-largest acceptable paths may
carry ﬂow or not. The cost diﬀerence between any two acceptable or zero-acceptable
paths are within the band ε. By deﬁnition, each subset is disjoint, i.e.,
K⋂
k=0
Sεk = ∅; and
it is a subset of the ε-BRUE set, i.e., Sεk ⊆ FεBRUE . The following proposition will show
that Fεk and Sεk are equivalent sets.
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Proposition 4.5.1.
Fεk = Sεk, k = 0, · · · ,K. (4.5.4)
where Fεk is deﬁned in (4.5.2), Sεk is deﬁned in (4.5.3).
Proof. (1)Fεk ⊆ Sεk, k = 0, · · · ,K.
∀f ∈ Fεk , by deﬁnition, aε(f) ⊆ Pε
∗
k , i.e., ∀i, j ∈ aε(f), Ci(f)  min
j∈P
Cj(f) + ε 
Cj(f)+ε ⇒ Ci(f)−Cj(f)  ε. Similarly, Cj(f)−Ci(f)  ε. In summary, |Ci(f)−Cj(f)|
ε,∀i, j ∈ Pε∗kl ⇒ f ∈ Sεk.
(2)Sεk ⊆ Fεk , k = 0, · · · ,K.
When k = 0:
∀i ∈ aε(f), f ∈ Sε0 , we need to show i ∈ PUE . Assume i ∈ PUE, since f ∈ Sε0 , then
fi = 0. On the other hand, because i ∈ aε(f), fi > 0, contradicted with fi = 0. Thus
∀i ∈ aε(f), i ∈ PUE , i.e., aε(f) ⊆ PUE ,∀f ∈ Sε0 ⊆ FεBRUE ⇒ f ∈ Fε0 . So Fε0 ⊆ Sε0 .
Combing with the result from (1), Fε0 = Sε0 .
When k = 1, similarly, aε(f) ⊆ Pε∗1 ,∀f ∈ Sε1 , and PUE ⊂ aε(f) as ∃i ∈ Pε
∗
1
l \PUE :
fi > 0, i.e., at least one newly added path needs to carry ﬂow. Because Sε1 ⊆ FεBRUE\Sε0 ,
and Fε0 = Sε0 , therefore PUE ⊂ aε(f) ⊆ Pε
∗
1
l ,∀f ∈ FεBRUE\Fε0 , so f ∈ Fε1 .
We can repeat this proof similarly for k = 2, · · · ,K. Therefore Sεk ⊆ Fεk , k =
0, · · · ,K.
In conclusion, Fεk = Sεk, k = 0, · · · ,K.
Proposition (4.5.1) shows that by constructing each ﬂow subset as in Equa-
tion (4.5.3), then it is equivalent to the deﬁnition of the subset in Equation (4.5.2).
The union of these subsets constitutes the ε-BRUE set:
Corollary 3.
FεBRUE =
K⋃
k=1
Sεk. (4.5.5)
where Sεj is deﬁned in Equation (4.5.3). In summary, Proposition (4.5.4) and Corol-
lary (3) provide the methodology of constructing the ε-BRUE set. The following exam-
ple will illustrate this methodology.
Example 4.5.1. The topology of the test network, the OD demand between nodes
1 − 4 and link cost functions are illustrated in Figure (4.5) with ε = 15. Red lines
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display four paths: 1-3-4 (path 1),1-3-2-4 (path 2), 1-2-3-4 (path 3), 1-2-4 (path 4).
The equilibrium path ﬂow pattern is [2, 2, 0, 2], i.e., path 1,2 and 4 are utilized under
UE. Substituting Pε∗0l = {1, 2, 4}, path costs and demands into MPEC (4.4.2), we obtain
ε∗1 = 6.5, f = [1.5, 3, 0, 1.5], C(f) = [96.5, 103, 103, 96.5]. In other words, if ε∗1 > 6.5, path
3 is utilized as well. Since ε = 15 > ε∗1, we know Pε=15 = {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
3
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Path 1
Path 2
Path 3
Path 4
d=6
X3
10x1
10x650+x2
50+x4
10+x5
Figure 4.5: Single OD pair network illustration
Due to ﬂow conservation of the ﬁxed demand, its BRUE solution set can be charac-
terized by the ﬁrst three paths. The whole BRUE solution set is shown in Figure (4.6),
composed of a 3-path yellow subset and a 4-path magenta subset. Each subset satisﬁes
Equation (4.5.4):
Fε=150 = {f ∈ F : ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 4} : fi, fj  0, |Ci(f)− Cj(f)| 15, f1 + f2 + f4 = 6; f3 = 0};
Fε=151 = {f ∈ F : ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 4} : fi  0; f3 > 0; f1 + f2 + f3 + f4 = 6;
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} : |Ci(f)− Cj(f)| 15}.
Within Fε=150 , path 3 does not carry ﬂow, so the 3-path subset is on the bottom of the
(f1, f2, f3) coordinates; Within Fε=151 , path 3 begins to carry ﬂow and f3 > 0. Either
the 3-path subset or the 4-path subset is convex, but their union is not convex, which
is consistent with results in Lou et al. (2010).
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Figure 4.6: BRUE solution set illustration composed of two pieces
4.5.2 ε-BRUE path ﬂow set for multiple OD pairs
After knowing the methodology of obtaining all acceptable paths sets for multiple OD
pairs in Section (4.4.2), it is not diﬃculty to generalize the methodology of constructing
the ε-BRUE set for a single OD pair to multiple OD pairs. For a network with multiple
OD pairs, the ε-BRUE set is the union of all subsets where demands are assigned to all
acceptable paths across OD pairs:
FεBRUE =
K⋃
k=1
Sε∗k , (4.5.6)
where,
Sε1  {f ∈ F : ∀ i, j ∈ PUE : fwi , fwj  0, |Cwi (f)− Cwj (f)| εw;
∀ i ∈ PUE : fwi = 0, w ∈ W}.
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Sεk  {f ∈ F : ∀ i ∈ P
ε∗k−2
l : f
w
i  0;∃i ∈ P
ε∗k−1
l \P
ε∗k−2
l : f
w
i > 0;
∀ i, j ∈ Pε
∗
k−1
l : |Cwi (f)− Cwj (f)| εw;
∀ i ∈ Pε
∗
k−1
l : f
w
i = 0, w ∈ W}, k = 2, · · · ,K.
where, K is the total number of acceptable path sets; Pε∗kl is deﬁned in Equation (4.4.3).
4.6 Topological properties of the BRUE set
After the BRUE path ﬂow set is obtained, it is crucial to explore its topological prop-
erties to facilitate BR related applications.
4.6.1 Closedness and compactness
A closed set can guarantee that if the solution is on the boundary, it can be attained.
Compactness of a set has many well-established characteristics in the ﬁeld of topology.
So it is essential to know whether the BRUE set is compact or not.
Heine-Borel theorem says that, if a set is closed and bounded, then it is compact.
So boundedness and closedness will be established ﬁrst.
Proposition 4.6.1. FεBRUE is bounded.
Proof. Since F is bounded, and FεBRUE ⊂ F . Thus FεBRUE is bounded.
Proposition 4.6.2. FεBRUE is closed.
Proof. FεBRUE deﬁned by Inequalities (4.5.2) is closed obviously. Since the union of the
closed sets are closed, so FεBRUE is closed.
Following the two propositions above and Heine-Borel theorem, we have:
Corollary 4. FεBRUE is compact.
4.6.2 Connectedness
A topological space X is said to be connected if it cannot be represented as the union of
two disjoint, nonempty, open sets. A topological space X is said to be path connected
if for all x1, x2 ∈ X, there exists a path τ such that τ(0) = x1 and τ(1) = x2. It can be
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shown that if X is path connected, it is also connected. So we will show that FεBRUE is
path-connected and therefore connected.
Proposition 4.6.3. FεBRUE is connected given aﬃne linear cost functions.
Proof. First of all, it can be shown that each subset is connected. Each subset is the
solution set of a system of linear inequalities |Ci(f)−Cj(f)| ε,∀i, j ∈ PUE or Pkl , k =
0, · · · ,K, which is a polytope, so it is connected.
Secondly, we will show that Fεk , k = 0, · · · ,K − 1 and Fεk+1 are connected pairwise
by mathematical induction. Start with k = 0. The monotonic property implies that
PUE ⊂ P1l .
Denote f0 ∈ Fε0 , f1 ∈ Fε1 . Let the path k ∈ P1l \PUE . Then for f0: f0k = 0, |Ck(f0)−
Ci(f
0)|> ε,∀i ∈ PUE . For f1: f1k > 0, Ck(f1) − Ci(f1) > ε,∀i ∈ PUE . With continuous
path cost functions, there must exist a ﬂow pattern f∗ ∈ Fε0 such that f∗k = 0, |Ck(f∗)−
Ci(f
∗)| ε,∀i ∈ PUE . Then f∗ ∈ Fε1 . Consequently f∗ ∈ Fε0
⋂Fε1 = ∅.
As Fε0 and Fε1 are connected, i.e., there exist paths p0, p1 joining f0, f1 with f∗
respectively. Therefore there exists a path p = p0
⋃
p1 joining f
0 and f1 through f∗, i.e.,
Fε0 and Fε1 are path-connected and therefore connected pairwise.
Similarly, Fεk and Fεk+1, k = 1, · · · ,K − 1 are connected pairwise. In conclusion,
FεBRUE =
⋃K
k=0Fεk is connected.
4.6.3 Non-convexity
Lou et al. (2010) illustrated the non-convexity of FεBRUE . The following validates the-
oretically this statement:
Proposition 4.6.4. Given aﬃne linear link performance function, Fεk is a polytope;
however, FεBRUE is generally non-convex.
Proof. An immediate result from inequalities (4.5.2) showing that Fεk is a polytope.
However, the union of the convex sets are not necessarily convex; furthermore, as the
number of acceptable paths each polyhedron contains is diﬀerent, so the union of poly-
tope in diﬀerent dimensions is surely not convex if there exists more than one subset.
Chapter 5
Boundedly rational Braess
paradox
5.1 Introduction and motivation
The network design problem (NDP) is to improve the road network performance by
determining a set of plans, such as building new roads, expanding existing roads
or enforcing congestion pricing, based on certain route choice behavior assumption
(Yang and Bell 1998b). However, building more roads may not necessarily enhance
the system performance due to the Braess paradox (Braess 1969; Braess et al. 2005).
Network planners should be cautious of the Braess paradox while making a new network
design.
5.1.1 Literature review on the Braess paradox
The Braess paradox was ﬁrst illustrated by a real-life example in Stuttgart: A road
investment failed to yield expected beneﬁts until another street was closed (Murchland
1970). Its existence was also tested in various experimental games from the perspec-
tive of the behavioural theory (Rapoport et al. 2009, Schneider and Weimann 2004,
Selten et al. 2004).
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Murchland (1970) analyzed that the Braess paradox results from self routing and
suggested avoiding it by reducing the discrepancy between selﬁsh routing and opti-
mal routing. Researchers further explored conditions when the Braess paradox oc-
curs: Pas and Principio (1997) showed that Braess paradox only occurs when the travel
demand is within a certain range. Frank (1981) and Steinberg and Zangwill (1983)
studied necessary and suﬃcient conditions when the Braess paradox occurs for general
networks with linear link cost functions; Dafermos and Nagurney (1984) proposed a
positive semideﬁnite matrix to test whether the paradox occurs with asymmetric link
travel times.
There are also many studies extending the paradox to more general contexts. Smith
(1978) illustrated how an increase in the travel time on an uncongested road can lead to
a reduction in the total delay. Fisk (1979) studied the paradox in a two-mode network
with transit and auto, where transit travel time may decrease when the auto demand
increases. Steinberg and Stone (1988) showed that an increase in one link’s congestion
level can lead to abandonment of another link. Yang and Bell (1998a) found that adding
a new road segment might reduce the network capacity.
In addition, the Braess paradox was shown to prevail in other types of
networks: computer networks (Kameda et al. 2000; Korilis et al. 1999), mechani-
cal and electrical networks (Cohen and Horowitz 1991), large-scale random graphs
(Valiant and Roughgarden 2006) and large sparse graphs (Chung and Young 2010).
5.1.2 Contribution
The contributions of this chapter are two-fold:
• This chapter generalizes the existence conditions of the Braess paradox from the
classical Braess network to grid networks with Bureau of Public Roads (BPR)
link performance functions and shows that the Braess paradox can easily occur in
ordinary networks;
• Given the boundedly rational assumption, how travelers react to addition of new
links in a network has never been explored. This chapter aims to shed light on
when the Braess paradox occurs under the boundedly rational driver behavior in
the classical Braess network and ordinary grid networks. Especially, the impacts
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of the indiﬀerence band and the congestion sensitivity of link cost functions on
the occurrence of the Braess paradox is analyzed. This study can thus oﬀer guide-
lines for network planners when network design proposals are made within the
boundedly rational framework.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the deﬁnition of bounded ratio-
nality user equilibria (BRUE) and the methodology of characterizing the BRUE set in
the classical Braess network are given. Due to non-uniqueness of the BRUE set, three
attitudes, risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-prone towards building new links are dis-
cussed, which are based on the best, the worst and the distribution of the system travel
time respectively. In Section 5.3, the paradox analysis starts with the Braess network
with aﬃne linear link performance functions. The methodologies of computing the best
and the worst ﬂow patterns are introduced. When the Braess paradox happens given
the demand level and the indiﬀerence band are followed. In Section 5.4, the paradox
analysis is discussed in grid networks with nonlinear link performance functions and a
more general condition of the occurrence of the paradox is given.
5.2 Braess paradox under boundedly rational user equi-
librium
The transportation network is represented by a directed graph that includes a set of
consecutively numbered nodes, N , and a set of consecutively numbered links, L. Let
W denote the origin-destination (OD) pair set (with W OD pairs) connected by a set
of simple paths (composed of a sequence of distinct nodes), Pw, through the network.
The traﬃc demand between each OD pair is dw ∈ R+ (where R+ represents the set
of all non-negative real numbers) and the traﬃc demand vector d = (dw)w∈W ∈ RW+ .
Let fwi denote the ﬂow on path i ∈ Pw for OD pair w, then the path ﬂow vector is
f = {fwi }i∈Pw,w∈W . The feasible path ﬂow set is to assign the traﬃc demand onto the
feasible paths: F  {f : f  0, ∑
i∈Pw
fwi = d
w,∀w ∈ W}. Denote xa as the link ﬂow
on link a, then the link ﬂow vector is x = {xa}a∈L. Each link a ∈ L is assigned a
cost function which is a function of the link ﬂow, written as c(x). Let δwa,i = 1 if link
a is on path i connecting OD pair w, and 0 if not; then Δ  {δwa,i}w∈Wa∈L,i∈P denotes the
99
link-path incidence matrix. We have the relationship x = Δf . Denote Cwi (f) as the
path cost on path i for OD pair w, then the path cost vector C(f)  {Cwi (f)}w∈Wi∈P . So
C(f) = ΔT c(x) under the additive path cost assumption.
Under the user equilibrium (UE), the paradox is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 5.2.1. The Braess paradox happens, if the system travel time (STT) after
new links are added is higher than the one without them, i.e., STTw > STTwo, where
STTw is the STT with new links and STTwo is the one without.
Due to the non-uniqueness of the BRUE, the road network may operate at diﬀer-
ent equilibrium ﬂow patterns with new links and without, resulting in uncertain road
network operation. Network planners may hold diﬀerent attitudes towards whether to
build a new link or not if uncertainty exists:
• If network planners assume the worst case is most likely to happen after the new
link is added, and the best case is very possible to occur without it, then we say
that this planner has an attitude preference of ‘risk-averse’ towards building a new
link;
• If network planners assume the best case is most likely to happen after the new
link is built, while the worst case occurs most likely without it, then this planner
holds an attitude of ‘risk-prone’ towards building the new link;
• If network planners’ decisions are not aﬀected by the degree of uncertainty in ﬂow
distributions and only the expected performance is considered with and without
a new link, we call this attitude as ‘risk-neutral.’
The worst and the best cases aforementioned can be represented by the maximum
and the minimum STT values among the BRUE ﬂow patterns:
Deﬁnition 5.2.2. In a network with W OD pairs with the traﬃc demand vector d and
the indiﬀerence band vector ε, the worst and the best cases are deﬁned as the maximum
and the minimum STT (denoted as ‘w-STT’ and ‘b-STT’ respectively) among the ε-
BRUE solution set, i.e.,
w-STT (d, ε) = max
f∈FεBRUE
STT (d, f), (5.2.1a)
b-STT (d, ε) = min
f∈FεBRUE
STT (d, f). (5.2.1b)
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Assume there exists a distribution g(STT ) over the STT interval satisfying:
∫ w-STT
b-STT
g(STT )dSTT = 1, (5.2.2)
Then the expected performance is computed as the integral of the distribution from
b-STT to w-STT , i.e.,
ESTT (d, ε) =
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTg(STT )dSTT. (5.2.3)
Based on diﬀerent attitudes towards risk caused by non-uniqueness of the BRUE
solution, the following scenarios for the Braess paradox are deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 5.2.3. (a) Risk-averse Braess paradox happens, if the worst STT after
new links are added is higher than the best one without them, i.e., w-STTw >
b-STTwo;
(b) Risk-prone Braess paradox happens, if the best STT after new links are added is
higher than the worst one without them, i.e., b-STTw > w-STTwo;
(c) Risk-neutral Braess paradox happens, provided distributions gw(STT ), gwo(STT )
over the STT interval satisfying Equation (5.2.2),if its expectation after new links
are added is higher than that without, i.e.,∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgw(STT )dSTT >
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgwo(STT )dSTT.
Denote SRA as the (d, ε) region for the risk-averse paradox where (d, ε) ∈ RW+ ×RW+ ,
SRP for the risk-prone paradox and SRN for the risk-neutral paradox. Mathematically,
SRA = {(d, ε) : w-STTw > b-STTwo} , (5.2.4a)
SRP = {(d, ε) : b-STTw > w-STTwo} , (5.2.4b)
SRN =
{
(d, ε) :
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgw(STT )dSTT >
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgwo(STT )dSTT
}
.
(5.2.4c)
Then we have the following proposition for three paradox regions:
Proposition 5.2.1. SRP ⊂ SRN ⊂ SRA.
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Proof. (1) Show SRP ⊂ SRN .
Given
∫w-STT
b-STT g
w(STT )dSTT = 1,
∫w-STT
b-STT g
wo(STT )dSTT = 1, we have for all
(d, ε) ∈ RW+ × RW+ ,
b-STTw 
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgw(STT )dSTT  w-STTw,
b-STTwo 
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgwo(STT )dSTT  w-STTwo.
If b-STTw > w-STTwo, then∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgw(STT )dSTT  b-STTw > w-STTwo 
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgwo(STT )dSTT.
Therefore
∫w-STT
b-STT STTg
w(STT )dSTT >
∫w-STT
b-STT STTg
wo(STT )dSTT and then
SRP ⊂ SRN .
(2) Show SRN ⊂ SRA. If
∫w-STT
b-STT STTg
w(STT )dSTT >∫w-STT
b-STT STTg
wo(STT )dSTT , then
w-STTw 
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgw(STT )dSTT >
∫ w-STT
b-STT
STTgwo(STT )dSTT  b-STTwo.
So w-STTw > b-STTwo and thus SRN ⊂ SRA.
Remark. The above proposition states that the risk-averse planners are the most con-
servative among three types of planners. Therefore a risk-averse paradox must be a
risk-neutral or a risk-prone paradox; however, a risk-neutral or a risk-prone paradox is
not necessarily a risk-averse one. The similar statement holds for the risk-neutral and
the risk-prone paradox.
When the following conditions are satisﬁed, we have a “strong” deﬁnition of the
Braess paradox:
Deﬁnition 5.2.4. (a) Braess paradox happens, if the best case after new links are
added is higher than the worst one without them, i.e., b-STTw > w-STTwo;
(b) Braess paradox does not happen, if the worst case after new links are added is
lower than the best one without them, i.e., w-STTw < b-STTwo.
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No matter which extremal values we use to determine the occurrence of the paradox,
it is prerequisite to compute the worst and the best STTs. Given BRUE NCP formula-
tion in Equation (4.2.6), solving the extremal cases is equivalent to solving mathematical
programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC):
min /max STT (d, f)
s.t.
0  fwi ⊥ Cwi (f) + ρwi − πw  0,∀i ∈ Pw,∀w ∈ W,
0  πw ⊥ dw −
∑
i∈Pw
fwi  0,∀w ∈ W.
5.3 Braess paradox analysis on the Braess network
We will ﬁrst study the Braess paradox under BRUE in the classical Braess network
(Braess 1969), because:
• The Braess paradox under bounded rationality is fairly new and no research ef-
forts have been conducted. A simpler network will be a good starting point to
investigate its properties;
• A simple network allows us to present the analysis in a more intuitive way by
illustrating results graphically.
The classical Braess network is shown in Figure (5.1): link 1 (from node 1 to 3),
2 (from node 1 to 2), 3 (from node 3 to 4) and 4 (from node 2 to 4) form the basic
network; while link 5 (from node 3 to 2) is a new link to be added. The link travel time
function is listed by each link, where a1, a2, b1, b2 are cost function parameters. The
total demand traveling from origin node 1 to destination node 4 is denoted as d.
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3
2
1 4
d
b1x1 a1+b x2 3
a2+b x2 5
a1+b x2 2 b1x4
Figure 5.1: Braess network illustration
When link 5 is not added, there are two alternative paths: 1-3-4 (path 1) and 1-2-4
(path 2), called ‘2-path scenario’. Two path costs are computed as:
C1 = (b1 + b2)f1 + a1, (5.3.1a)
C2 = (b1 + b2)f2 + a1. (5.3.1b)
When link 5 is added, there are three alternative paths: 1-3-4 (path 1), 1-2-4 (path
2) and 1-3-2-4 (path 3), called ‘3-path scenario.’ Three path costs are computed as:
C1 = (b1 + b2)f1 + b1f3 + a1, (5.3.2a)
C2 = (b1 + b2)f2 + b1f3 + a1, (5.3.2b)
C3 = b1(f1 + f2) + (2b1 + b2)f3 + a2. (5.3.2c)
In the following, all variables related to the 2-path scenario will have a subscript 2,
while those related to the 3-path scenario will have a subscript 3.
5.3.1 UE and BRUE
In this simple case, the user equilibrium (UE) ﬂow pattern for both scenarios can be
calculated by letting all path costs equal. Assume a1  a2, b1 > b2. In the 2-path
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scenario, UE2(d) =
[
d
2 ,
d
2
]T
. In the 3-path scenario:
UE3(d) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[
0, 0, d
]T
, 0  d < a1−a2b1+b2 ,[
−a1+a2+(b1+b2)d
b1+3b2
, −a1+a2+(b1+b2)db1+3b2 ,
2(a1−a2)−(b1−b2)d
b1+3b2
]T
, a1−a2b1+b2  d <
2(a1−a2)
b1−b2 ,[
d
2 ,
d
2 , 0
]T
, d  2(a1−a2)b1−b2 .
(5.3.3)
Interested readers can refer to Pas and Principio (1997) for detailed calculation of these
two UEs.
Remark. 1. The assumptions of a1  a2 and b1 > b2 guarantee that there exist three
cases of UE3 deﬁned in Equation (5.3.3), when the travel demand varies from zero
to inﬁnity (Pas and Principio 1997).
2. These two assumptions also ensure that the new link is attractive, due to lower
a2, b2 coeﬃcients in its cost function. Moreover, b1 > b2 necessitates the existence
of the Braess paradox under UE. As the new link is connected by two links whose
marginal cost with one more unit of ﬂow is higher than that of the new link, when
more travelers use the new link, congestions on these two connecting links may
cancel out time saving brought by the new link. If this is the case, the Braess
paradox happens.
In the 2-path scenario, by deﬁnition of the BRUE, if path 1 is shorter and path 2
is utilized, then C2 − C1  ε; If path 2 is shorter and path 1 is utilized, then C1 −
C2  ε. Therefore the BRUE ﬂow patterns in 2-path scenario must satisfy a system of
inequalities, given both paths are utilized:
BRUEε2 = {f : Ci(f)− Cj(f)  ε, i, j = 1, 2, i = j}. (5.3.4)
Although Equation (5.3.4) is initially obtained by assuming both paths are utilized,
it also holds for any BRUE ﬂow pattern with only one path utilized. That is, for the
2-path scenario, due to its special symmetric structure, when only one path is utilized,
the non-utilized path is always shorter, and thus there does not exist a BRUE ﬂow
pattern such that Ci(f) − Cj(f) > ε while fi = 0. In summary, Equation (5.3.4) holds
for any BRUE ﬂow pattern, whether both paths are utilized or only one path is utilized.
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In the 3-path scenario, if path 1 is the shortest and paths 2 and 3 are utilized, then
Ci − C1  ε, i, j = 2, 3; If path 2 is the shortest and paths 1 and 3 are utilized, then
Ci−C2  ε, i, j = 1, 3; Similarly, if path 3 is the shortest and path 1 and 2 are utilized,
then Ci − C3  ε, i, j = 1, 2. In summary, the BRUE ﬂow patterns in 3-path scenario
must satisfy a system of inequalities, given all three paths are utilized:
S = {f : Ci(f)−Cj(f)  ε, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i = j}. (5.3.5)
However, S may be a subset of the BRUE set due to the assumption that all three
paths are utilized. That is, there might be a BRUE ﬂow pattern such that Ci(f) −
Cj(f) > ε while fi = 0, i.e., a non-utilized path is outside the indiﬀerence band, which
does not belong to S yet is still BRUE. In the following, we will identify such special
BRUE ﬂow patterns with a non-utilized path outside the indiﬀerence band.
We ﬁrst look into the case when only one path is utilized, i.e., the traﬃc demand
is assigned to only one path. In this case, if the utilized path is either path 1 or path
2, it can be easily veriﬁed that the utilized path is the longest path, and thus there
does not exist a non-utilized path outside the indiﬀerence band. If the utilized path is
path 3, then the ﬂow pattern is BRUE with path 3 being the shortest path and path
1 and path 2 being the non-utilized paths outside the indiﬀerence band if and only if
the following conditions hold: d < a1−a2b1+b2 and ε < −(b1 + b2)d + a1 − a2. Under these
conditions, S = ∅ and the BRUE set is a singleton, i.e., BRUEε3 =
[
0, 0, d
]T
.
We then look into the case when only two paths are utilized, i.e., the traﬃc demand
is assigned to two of the three paths with one path being non-utilized. In this case, if
the non-utilized path is path 1 and thereby path 2 is utilized, C1 < C2 holds due to the
symmetry between path 1 and path 2. Thus under BRUE, the non-utilized path (path
1) cannot be outside the indiﬀerence band, otherwise the utilized path 2 would be ”even
more” outside the indiﬀerence band which contradicts BRUE. The same analysis holds
if path 2 is the non-utilized one. If the non-utilized path is path 3, then the ﬂow pattern
can be BRUE with path 3 being a non-utilized path outside the indiﬀerence band if and
only if the following conditions hold: d > 2(a1−a2)b1−b2 , ε < (b1 − b2)d − 2(a1 − a2), under
which there exists a special BRUE subset {f ∈ F : f3 = 0, |C1(f) − C2(f)|  ε}. This
subset is actually BRUEε2 and BRUE
ε
2 ⊆ BRUEε3 in this case. Note that this special
BRUE subset is never completely within S, i.e., BRUEε2 ⊆ S, because at least part of
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this subset is comprised of BRUE ﬂow patterns such that path 3 is not utilized yet is
the longest path outside the indiﬀerence band. Therefore the BRUE set is the union of
two convex sets BRUEε2 and S, i.e., BRUE
ε
3 = BRUE
ε
2
⋃
S. Although the BRUE ﬂow
set is generally non-convex, it still has a simple enough structure for us to graphically
solve for the best and worst cases.
Based on the above discussion, we can say that it holds S = BRUEε3 except for two
special cases identiﬁed above. Therefore,
BRUEε3 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[
0, 0, d
]T
, if d < a1−a2b1+b2 , ε < −(b1 + b2)d+ a1 − a2,
BRUEε2
⋃
S, if d > 2(a1−a2)b1−b2 , ε < (b1 − b2)d− 2(a1 − a2),
S, o.w.
(5.3.6)
In summary, the BRUE set for the Braess network is either convex (a singleton is
also convex) or the union of two convex subsets. Therefore it is closed and bounded and
thus compact. Given aﬃne linear cost functions, it is also connected. This property will
be used in the next section when we identify the best and the worst path ﬂow patterns.
5.3.2 Graphical solutions of the best and the worst cases
The paradox under BRUE is deﬁned upon the best and the worst ﬂow patterns in
the BRUE set. To identify the minimum and the maximum of STTs, we ﬁrst need
to study the properties of the STT function. Given aﬃne linear cost functions, the
STT is a quadratic function and the BRUE set is convex or non-convex with simple
structure. Solving extremal ﬂow patterns in Equation (5.2.5) is equivalent to solving
positive-deﬁnite quadratic programs over a convex set or the union of two convex sets.
The Braess network only contains two or three paths, therefore these two extremal cases
can be solved graphically.
Two-path scenario
The STT associated with a speciﬁc ﬂow pattern is computed as the product of ﬂows
and its associated travel costs. The system travel time for the 2-path scenario, denoted
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as ‘STT2’, is computed as:
STT2(d, f) =
2∑
i=1
Cifi = (b1 + b2)(f
2
1 + f
2
2 ) + a1d. (5.3.7)
STT2 is a quadratic function with respect to ﬂow patterns. Since STT is a continuous
function with respect to path ﬂows while the BRUE set is compact, the STT over the
BRUE set constitutes a closed interval, called the “STT interval.” The STT interval
can be represented graphically by a line segment connecting the best and the worst
values.
Before ﬁnding the minimum ﬂow pattern deﬁned in Equation (5.2.1b), it is important
to discuss the system optimal (SO), the feasible ﬂow distribution with the minimum STT
given a pre-determined traﬃc demand. Mathematically,
SO(d) = min
f∈F
STT(d, f).
If SO ∈ FεBRUE , then SO is the best ﬂow pattern.
In the 2-path scenario, SO2(d) =
[
d
2 ,
d
2
]T
. It is UE and is therefore BRUE. Thus it
is also the best ﬂow pattern.
Solving the worst ﬂow pattern is equivalent to maximizing a positive deﬁnite
quadratic program over a convex set. Therefore the worst ﬂow pattern should oc-
cur on one corner of BRUEε2. Its corner point is a feasible ﬂow pattern satisfying
C1(f)− C2(f) = ε or C2(f)−C1(f) = ε.
Three-path scenario
In the 3-path scenario, due to ﬂow conservation, the feasible ﬂow set can be characterized
by two path ﬂows, i.e., f3 = d− f1 − f2. Then STT3 can be computed as follows:
STT3(d, f) =
3∑
i=1
Cifi
= (b1 + 2b2)(f
2
1 + f
2
2 ) + 2b2f1f2 + [a1 − a2 − 2(b1 + b2)d] (f1 + f2)
+
[
(2b1 + b2)d
2 + a2d
]
. (5.3.8)
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Given a certain demand level, STT3 is also a quadratic equation with respect to path
ﬂows on the ﬁrst two paths. SO3 depends on the demand level:
SO3(d) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[
0, 0, d
]T
, 0  d < a1−a22(b1+b2) ,[ −a1+a2
2
+(b1+b2)d
b1+3b2
,
−a1+a2
2
+(b1+b2)d
b1+3b2
,
(a1−a2)−(b1−b2)d
b1+3b2
]T
, a1−a22(b1+b2)  d <
a1−a2
b1−b2 ,[
d
2 ,
d
2 , 0
]T
, d  a1−a2b1−b2 .
(5.3.9)
As aforementioned, if SO3 ∈ BRUE3, it is the best ﬂow pattern; or else the best
ﬂow pattern has to be identiﬁed otherwise.
For the worst ﬂow patterns, there are two cases:
1. If BRUE3 is convex, the worst ﬂow patterns must occur at one corner point;
2. if BRUE3 is the union of two convex subsets, the worst ﬂow patterns also occur at
one corner point of one subset. However, calculation is needed to compare which
subset’s corner point carries higher STT value.
UE3 is a special case of BRUE3, which can help to locate the BRUE set. SO3 has
the minimum STT value, which facilitates ﬁnding the extremal cases. As the demand
level varies, UE3 and SO3 have ﬁve possible relative positions shown in Figure (5.2).
The triangle area encompassed by two axes and the line f1+f2 = d is the feasible region.
STT3 is a conic function with respect to the ﬁrst two path ﬂows and thus its contours
(i.e., all ﬂow patterns with the same STT3 values) are ellipses, centered at SO3. The
best and the worst ﬂow patterns are those BRUE which are located at the nearest and
the farthest STT contours from SO3.
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f1
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b1−b2  d <
2(a1−a2)
b1−b2
f2
f1
UE SO/3 3
(e) d  2(a1−a2)
b1−b2
Figure 5.2: Relative positions of UE3 and SO3
In Figure (5.2b-5.2c), SO3 may be closer to UE3 or closer to the boundary of the
feasible region f1 + f2 = d. When SO3 is closer to UE3, as ε varies, the worst and the
best ﬂow patterns are diﬀerent from those when SO3 is closer to f1+f2 = d. Therefore,
it is further split into two scenarios. Similarly UE3 may be closer to the origin or to
SO3 in Figure (5.2d). In conclusion, to capture all possibilities of the worst and the
best ﬂow patterns, the demand level should be divided into eight intervals (shown in
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Figure (5.3 and A.1-A.7)). Within each demand interval, the best and the worst ﬂow
patterns depend on the value of ε and we will discuss them as ε increases from zero
to ∞. In the following, Case 1 when 0  d < a1−a22(b1+b2) (shown in Figure (5.3)) will be
elaborated upon.
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Figure 5.3: Case 1: 0  d < a1−a22(b1+b2)
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Figure (5.3a)-(5.3e) illustrate the worst and the best cases when 0  d < a1−a22(b1+b2) ,
as ε gradually increases. The slanted line and the triangle are the feasible sets for
two scenarios respectively. The blue line segment is BRUE2 and the green polytope is
BRUE3. Grey elliptical lines are STT contours, facilitating identiﬁcation of the best
and the worst cases. A star represents the best-case ﬂow pattern, while circles indicate
the worst cases on the corner points of the BRUE set. There exist two worst ﬂow
patterns because of symmetry of the BRUE set.
When 0  ε < (b1 + b2)d (shown in Figure (5.3a)), ε is too small to divert ﬂows
from path 3 to path 1 or 2, so BRUE3 contains only one ﬂow pattern-the origin and
therefore the worst and the best cases are the same. The worst ﬂow patterns for 2-path
scenario are corner points of BRUE2. As ε grows till (b1+b2)d (shown in Figure (5.3b)),
any feasible ﬂow pattern under 2-path scenario belongs to BRUE2, so the worst ﬂow
patterns for 2-path scenario are corner points of the line f1 + f2 = d. If ε continues to
grow up to −(b1+ b2)d+a1−a2 (shown in Figure (5.3c)), BRUE3 starts to expand and
the best ﬂow pattern is the upper right corner point which is closest to SO3, indicated
by a circle. Continue this analysis until ε is so large that every feasible ﬂow pattern
under 3-path scenario is BRUE3. Similar analysis can be applied to other seven cases
under diﬀerent demand levels shown in Appendix.
In Figure (5.3a-5.3b), below the path ﬂow coordinates is an axis representing the
STT, with its value increasing to the right. STT values for both scenarios are plotted
on this axis. STT3 is a single value and STT2 interval locates on the right side of STT3,
denoting that STT2 is higher than STT3. Thus the Braess paradox never happens.
Similar analysis can be applied to Figure (5.3c). In Figure (5.3d-5.3e), two STT intervals
overlap. So whether the paradox happens or not depends on which BRUE ﬂow pattern
is used for the analysis (i.e., which attitude planners hold). This will be discussed in
detail in the next section.
Remark. In Case 8 shown in Figure (A.7b), BRUE3 is non-convex which reﬂects the
only non-convex situation discussed in Section 5.3.1. BRUE2 is one subset of BRUE3,
therefore it is hidden. The other subset S is indicated by a green triangle. After
calculation, we ﬁnd out that the worst ﬂow pattern is the corner point of BRUE2 not
that of S.
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5.3.3 Paradox synthesis over (d, ε) region
After analyzing the STT functions as the demand level or the indiﬀerence band varies
respectively, we are ready to explore how STTs vary with both variables.
One (d, ε) pair determines a BRUE set, among which each ﬂow pattern is associated
with a STT value. As analyzed in Section 5.3.2, the STT values over a BRUE set con-
stitutes a compact interval. Figure (5.4) summarizes the STT intervals in two scenarios
within the (d, ε) region. The x-axis is the demand level and the y-axis represents the
indiﬀerence band level. Same colors are used to indicate STT intervals in two scenarios
as in Figure (5.3): the blue line segment represents STT2 while the green line segment
indicates STT3.
Though there exist a STT2 interval and a STT3 interval for each (d, ε) pair, under
certain combinations of d and ε, the STT intervals in two scenarios display similar
“patterns”. The pattern here we mean that the STT interval is either a single value
or an interval, and two STT intervals have similar relative positions. When two STTs
display similar patterns over a set of (d, ε) pairs, only one pattern is plotted. For
example, when 0  d < a1−a22(b1+b2) and 0  ε < −(b1 + b2)d + a1 − a2, STT3 is a single
value while STT2 is an interval lying on the right side of STT3 (i.e., every STT value in
2-path scenario is larger than that in 3-path scenario). Therefore we can illustrate this
pattern in one set of STT2 and STT3 intervals, shown in the left bottom region in pink
color.
Under various combinations of d and ε, STT2 and STT3 have diﬀerent values and
diﬀerent relative positions (as illustrated in Figure (5.3,A.1-A.7)). Therefore the points
over the (d, ε) region can be grouped into multiple subregions. In Figure (5.4), the
vertical dividing lines indicate critical values of d, while the horizontal lines and oblique
ones represent critical values of ε with the formula listed next to the separating lines.
The pink region is when the paradox does not happen while the yellow region is when
the paradox always happens. The green region is when three attitudes are needed to
determine whether the paradox happens or not.
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Figure 5.4: STT intervals over (d, ε) region
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5.3.4 Braess paradox regions under three diﬀerent attitudes
In this subsection, we will plot SRP , SRN , SRA for the Braess network and study their
relationships, given cost parameters a1 = 50, a2 = 10, b1 = 10, b2 = 1.
Summarizing the analysis of the best and the worst STTs for eight cases in Sec-
tion 5.3.2 will give us complete STT functions. As STTs are functions of both d and
ε, 3-dimensional surfaces over (d, ε) region are used to illustrate them. In Figure (5.5),
the red surface denotes w-STT3 and the yellow one denotes b-STT2. The region where
the red is above the yellow surface is when the paradox happens. Since we are compar-
ing the worst value with link 5 to the best one without, this represents the risk-averse
attitude.
Figure 5.5: Risk-averse paradox
For ease of visualization, we project these two surfaces onto the 2-dimensional (d, ε)
plane in Figure (5.6a). The paradox happens over the red region. The demand level is
divided into eight intervals, with each interval representing one case discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. Under each demand interval, C is short for ‘Case’ and the number following
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it denotes the case number. When ε = 0, the risk-averse paradox only occurs when the
demand falls within an intermediate level (i.e., 2.6  d  8.8), which is consistent with
the paradox analysis under UE in Pas and Principio (1997).
In Figure (5.6c), the red surface refers to b-STT3 and the yellow one represents w-
STT2. The red region is when the paradox happens. This represents the risk-prone
attitude. Similarly, when ε = 0, the risk-prone paradox only occurs when 2.6  d  8.8.
Increasing ε may cause the risk-prone paradox to disappear when the demand level is
too low and to happen when the demand level is high.
Assuming a uniform distribution over the STT interval, i.e., g(STT ) = 1STT , the
mean of the STT is the arithmetic average of the best and the worst values. The Braess
paradox with the risk-neutral attitude is shown in Figure (5.6b). Similarly, the risk-
neutral paradox only occurs when 2.6  d  8.8 given ε = 0. Increasing ε may cause
the risk-prone paradox to disappear, because the indiﬀerence band can help improve
the system performance in the best scenario.
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(a) Risk-averse region SRA
(b) Risk-neutral region SRN
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These three paradox regions satisfy the relationship shown in Proposition (5.2.1).
Given ε = 0, the demand level under which three paradoxes happen are the same. When
the paradox under UE happens, the risk-averse paradox surely occurs with ε > 0, but
the risk-prone or risk-neutral paradox does not necessarily occur; on the other hand,
even when the paradox under UE does not happen, it may occur when ε > 0.
5.4 Braess paradox analysis in grid networks
Section 5.3 mainly focuses on deriving existence conditions of the Braess paradox an-
alytically in the classical Braess network. Although this network structure makes it
easy to illustrate the paradox graphically, the structure itself is unusual or extreme (at
least in transportation networks), which gives the implication that Braess paradox can
happen only in this kind of extreme networks, or at least it is unclear whether it can
happen in other more “ordinary” networks. In this section, we will generalize the para-
dox conditions under BRUE to simple and ordinary grid networks with regular BPR
link performance functions, to further demonstrate the potential of the Braess paradox
occurring in real transportation networks.
5.4.1 A grid network with one OD pair
Consider a simple grid network as shown in Figure (5.7). To make the network “ordi-
nary”, we consider that all links have the same commonly used BPR link cost function.
The link cost structure in this example simply represents a usual case that all roads in
the network are of similar standards. Consider that there is one OD pair from Node O
to Node D with a demand level d = 2. For this network, the UE ﬂow on each link is
x = 1, and the UE travel time between OD is 3.45.
4
1
D3
2O
Cm( )1+0.15x^4
t(x)=1+0.15x^4
Figure 5.7: A grid network with BPR link cost functions
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Now consider one middle link is added from node 1 to 4, indicated as dotted line
in Figure (5.7). We shall demonstrate that, if the newly added middle link is faster
than the existing links, then Braess paradox could occur, i.e. the new UE travel time
between OD could be higher than 3.45. For simplicity, let the newly added middle link
have a BPR link cost function t(x) = cm(1 + 0.15x
4), where cm is the free ﬂow travel
time of the new middle link. Here we use cm to represent the fast degree of the new
link, i.e. the new link is the same with existing links if cm = 1, is slower if cm > 1,
and is faster if cm < 1. Under UE, the relationship of cm and the new UE travel time
is plotted in Figure (5.8). In Figure (5.8), the x-axis is the free ﬂow travel time of the
new link, while the y-axis is the new UE travel time between OD. As cm decreases (the
new link becomes faster), the new UE travel time ﬁrst decreases and then increases. In
particular, when the new link is so fast that cm < 0.75, the new UE travel time will be
higher than the original level 3.45, which means that the Braess paradox happens. If
the new link is ideally fast with a zero travel time, i.e., cm = 0, then the new UE travel
time will be 16 % higher than the original level 3.45.
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Figure 5.8: UE travel time comparison without and with the new link
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Because the network is a normal grid network with regular BPR link cost functions,
our result indicates that the Braess paradox can happen in the real world, especially in
grid networks. Retrospectively, the reason for the occurrence of the Braess paradox in
an ordinary grid network is simple: when a new fast link is added (or more generally,
some improvement is completed for some part of the network), users will be attracted
to use the new link, which will result in ﬂow concentration on links connected to the
new link. The detrimental congestion eﬀect of the ﬂow concentration could outweigh
the beneﬁcial eﬀect of the fastness of the new link. When this is the case, the Braess
paradox simply occurs. With this underlying philosophy, it is clear that, as long as the
new link is fast enough to attract users and thereby causes ﬂow concentration in its
vicinity, there is a possibility of the Braess paradox occurring.
The above argument is especially true for transportation networks with BPR link
cost functions, because BPR cost functions are convex functions such that the congestion
eﬀect increases nonlinearly (more than linearly) with the level of ﬂow concentration. On
the other hand, the fastness of the new link reduces travel times only linearly with its
fast degree. Therefore, as the new link becomes faster, the congestion eﬀect of the
attracted ﬂow concentration increases at a higher rate than the fastness eﬀect itself
does, which means that, if the new link is too fast, the attracted congestion eﬀect could
outweigh the fastness eﬀect itself and thus the Braess paradox could occur. This implies
that, a “middle” link in a grid network with BPR link cost functions (like the one in
Figure (5.7)), if much faster than other links, could be a paradox link.
With the above example and analysis, and in view of the popularity and practicality
of BPR link cost functions and grid-kind networks in transportation ﬁeld, it is safe to
say that the occurrence of Braess paradox in transportation networks should not be too
surprising.
Because the congestion eﬀect of link cost functions plays an important role in the oc-
currence of the paradox, we introduce a term named ‘congestion sensitivity’ to describe
this congestion eﬀect. The congestion sensitivity of link i’s travel time, denoted as pi,
is measured by the power of the link ﬂow xi in its cost function ti(x). For example, if
the BPR function is used, i.e., t(x) = 1 + 0.15x4, the congestion sensitivity is p = 4.
To better understand the impact of the congestion eﬀect on the paradox, in the
following, we would like to study the relationship of the link cost congestion sensitivity
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and the occurrence of the risk-averse paradox. The reason we mainly focus on the
risk-averse paradox is that it represents the worst scenario given a new link is built.
Under BRUE, the worst STT can be solved from Equations (5.2.5) with GAMS software
(General Algebraic Modeling System, see Rosenthal and Brooke 2007).
Remark. As the BRUE set is non-convex, the best and the worst STTs computed by
GAMS may be sub-optima and deviate from actual best and worst values, but the rela-
tive gap between the solution and the optimum is 10% by default in computation. For
such a small network optimization, GAMS can actually provide very accurate solutions
by employing two reliable approaches (Ferris et al. 2002). Therefore the accuracy of
the computed STTs is controlled to be within 90% of optima in the following numerical
examples. The sensitivity analysis of the solution accuracy can be discussed but it goes
beyond the scope of this study, which will be our future investigation.
In the grid network shown in Figure (5.7), assume the demand level d = 2, the new
link travel time is cm(1 + 0.15x
p) and other links’ travel times are 1 + 0.15xp, where
p  0. Note that when p = 0, the cost function reduces to a constant 1.15; while when
p = 1, the cost function reduces to the linear function 1 + 0.15x.
In Figure (5.9), each line represents a frontier of the risk-averse paradox region as
the function of (ε, p), given a certain cm. When (ε, p) falls on the right upper part of
the frontier, the risk-averse paradox happens. When cm varies from 0 to 1.5 (the range
when the paradox ﬁrst happens and then disappears under UE), the occurrence of the
paradox may be aﬀected by both ε and p or dominated by either of them.
When cm = 0 (indicated by the red line with star markers), the paradox happens if
p  2.4 regardless of ε, because the new link is so fast that many travelers are attracted
to use it and two links connecting it suﬀer from the congestion eﬀect if the congestion
sensitivity is high.
When cm = 0.7 (indicated by the black dotted line with square markers) and 0.9
(indicated by the yellow line with circle markers), in general, the larger the congestion
sensitivity is, the more likely the risk-averse paradox happens given a smaller indiﬀerence
band. In other words, bounded rationality plays a diminishing role in the occurrence of
the paradox if the congestion sensitivity is higher, because the link cost is highly sensitive
to the ﬂow increase if the congestion sensitivity is large. However, when cm = 1.1
(indicated by the cyan line with cross markers) and 1.5 (indicated by the magenta line
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with diamond markers), the larger the congestion sensitivity is, the more likely the
risk-averse paradox happens with a larger indiﬀerence band. In other words, bounded
rationality plays a more important role in the occurrence of the paradox given the
congestion sensitivity is higher. This is because the paradox is dominated by ε when
cm is longer.
Therefore, there exists a critical travel cost of the newly built road so that the
indiﬀerence band and the congestion sensitivity play diﬀerent roles in the occurrence
of the paradox under and above this value. In the grid network shown in Figure (5.7),
cm = 1 is the threshold. In practice, the indiﬀerence band is determined by people’s
route choice behavior and the congestion sensitivity is one of the road characteristics,
so these two values are diﬃcult to modify. To reduce the likelihood of the occurrence
of the paradox, we need to carefully choose the travel cost of the new link.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
p
ε
 
 
Cm=0
Cm=0.7
Cm=0.9
Cm=1
Cm=1.1
Cm=1.5
Figure 5.9: Risk-averse Braess paradox frontier over (p, ε) region
5.4.2 A grid network with four OD pairs
Here we give a multiple-OD network to further demonstrate the Braess paradox in
transportation networks. Figure (5.10) shows a grid network with four OD pairs, from
node 1 to 6 (OD 1), from 1 to 9 (OD 2), from node 4 to 6 (OD 3), and from 4 to 9
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(OD 4). The demand level for each OD pair is d = 0.7. All current links have the same
BPR cost function: t(x) = 1 + 0.15x4. The new link is added from node 2 to 5 with a
BPR link cost function t(x) = cm(1 + 0.15x
4), where the free ﬂow cost cm reﬂects the
fast degree of the new link.
5
2
64
31
t(x)=1+0.15x^4
8 97
Cm(1+0.15x^4)
Figure 5.10: A grid network connecting four OD pairs with BPR link cost functions
Figure (5.11) plots the UE travel time of the four OD pairs as a function of the free
ﬂow travel time of the new middle link, cm. From our numerical results (also can be
seen from Figure (5.11)), when the new link has a free ﬂow travel time 0.10 < cm < 0.84
(faster than the existing links), the UE travel times of all the four OD pairs are higher
than the original costs without the new link, which means that the addition of the new
fast link increases the UE travel time of every road user. Thus it is clear that the newly
added link could easily be a “paradox” link if its fast degree is not carefully designed.
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Figure 5.11: Paradox analysis in the grid network connecting four OD pairs
It should be mentioned here that the above multiple-OD network example is not
constructed by much eﬀort, as we simply incorporate the elementary network of Fig-
ure (5.7) into this larger network. The point here is that, no matter how complex a
network is, as long as it is a grid-kind network with BPR-kind convex link cost functions,
a fast “middle” link could be a “paradox” link, due to the same reasons mentioned in
the small single-OD example.
To examine the impact of BRUE on Braess paradox, let us now consider that the
indiﬀerence band for OD pair 1 is 0.1 and zero for other OD pairs. In this network,
we only discuss the paradox conditions when the new link free ﬂow travel time cm
varies, provided the ﬁxed demand levels and the indiﬀerence bands for four OD pairs.
Figure (5.12) shows the best and the worst STT functions with respect to cm without and
with the new link. The blue dotted lines represent the worst and the best STTs without
the new link, and the red lines represent those with the new link. We can decompose
cm into multiple intervals and the occurrence of the paradox is indicated within each
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interval: ‘No BP’ means the paradox does not happen, ‘BP’ means the paradox deﬁnitely
happens and ‘BPRA’ means the risk-averse paradox happens. When the new link is too
fast (i.e., cm ∈ [0, 1]), i.e., the congestion eﬀect outweighs the beneﬁcial eﬀect brought
by the new link, either the paradox always happen (i.e., cm ∈ [0, 0.79]) or the risk-averse
paradox happens (i.e., cm ∈ [0.79, 1]). If the new link is too long (i.e., cm  1.18), no
one will use it and there is no reason to build it. Thus, if we plan to build this new link,
cm ∈ [1, 1.06] is recommended in this case.
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Figure 5.12: Paradox analysis in the grid network connecting four OD pairs
Remark. When cm < 0.4, the best and the worst STT functions seems overlapping but
their values are a little diﬀerent. When the new link is quite fast given the indiﬀerence
band ε = 0.1, most people traveling between OD pair 1 use the new link and only a few
use other routes. Thus, the worst scenario deviates only slightly from the best one and
the indiﬀerence band plays a very small role.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
Directions
In this chapter, we will ﬁrst summarize three signiﬁcant research ﬁndings of this disserta-
tion in empirical validation, theoretical modeling and application of boundedly rational
route choice behavior. Then research gaps of this dissertation will be pinpointed. As
a growing research ﬁeld in travel behavior study, several promising research directions
will also be provided.
6.1 Conclusions
This dissertation is motived by the irreversible response to a network change due to the
reopening of the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis. To explain this anomalous phenomenon,
a boundedly rational route choice framework is proposed. Within this framework, em-
pirical analysis and theoretical modeling are developed, as well as its implication for
transportation planning.
First, by analyzing route choices of commuters in the Twin Cities before and after
the reopening of the I-35W Bridge, we reveal that there exists a time saving threshold
under which drivers will not switch to the new bridge. This threshold results from
people’s stickiness of driving habits and is characterized by an indiﬀerence band. A
probit model is used to estimate this indiﬀerence band by utilizing GPS travel data.
As bounded rationality successfully explains observed anomaly, this empirical work
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provides insights into the cause of the irreversible network change and sheds lights on
route choice behavior estimation with empirical data.
Second, by analyzing the interior structure of the BRUE set, this dissertation shows
that the BRUE set can be decomposed into ﬁnite subsets and each subset is convex
if aﬃne linear link performance functions are employed. As a result, a systematic
methodology of obtaining BRUE solutions is proposed for networks with ﬁxed demands.
The topological properties of the BRUE set are also studied.
The theoretical aspects of BRUE solutions help predict BRUE link ﬂow patterns
in a network, paving the way for bounded rationality related applications. The most
crucial application is the Braess paradox analysis under bounded rationality. This
dissertation studies the general existence condition of the Braess paradox in ordinary
networks and analyzed the Braess paradox based on boundedly rational route choice
behavior assumption. The analysis shows that Braess Paradox can easily occur in
ordinary networks and the impact of BRUE on the Braess Paradox varies as the newly
built link cost changes. In contrast to the previous Braess paradox analysis which is
only inﬂuenced by the demand level, the occurrence of the boundedly rational Braess
paradox becomes more complicated and depends on both the demand level and the
indiﬀerence band.
6.2 Research gaps of this dissertation
Though this dissertation provides a comprehensive framework of boundedly rational
travel behavior modeling and estimation, there are several research directions which
need to be extended.
6.2.1 Empirical veriﬁcation and estimation
Though it is the ﬁrst eﬀort in estimating the indiﬀerence band by utilizing empirical
GPS data collected in the Twin Cities, the empirical study is subject to limitations. Ac-
cording to the distribution of estimated time saving brought by using the new bridge,
stayers are decomposed into two groups: stayers from one group do not switch be-
cause the saved time is marginal; the other group of stayers decides to stay even when
saved time is substantial. This may result from the relatively small sample size or the
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behavioral heterogeneity among travelers.
Nowadays, not only aggregated detector data at ﬁxed locations, but also mobile
sensor data from GPS or smart-phones for individual travelers are available. With
travel behavioral data from various sources in place, empirical veriﬁcation of bounded
rationality should continue and bounded rationality parameters need to be estimated
for more metropolitan areas.
6.2.2 Mathematical properties of BRUE
One of the contribution of this dissertation is that the BRUE set can be decomposed
into multiple convex subsets provided with aﬃne linear link cost functions. However, it
is still a big challenge to understand the topological properties of the BRUE set with
general link cost functions. Deeper understanding of the equilibrium set’s mathematical
properties will provide better prediction of traﬃc ﬂow patterns and facilitate bounded
rationality applications.
Furthermore, existing studies on analytical properties of BRUE assume that deter-
ministic ﬂow-dependent travel time is the only factor inﬂuencing route choices. Two
other major contributing factors, travel time reliability and monetary cost, have been
incorporated into perfect rationality models and accordingly UE is subjected to many
variants: Stochastic UE (SUE), Probabilistic UE (PUE) (Lo et al. 2006), Late ar-
rival penalized UE (LAPUE) (Watling 2006), Mean-excess traﬃc equilibrium (METE)
(Chen and Zhou 2010; Chen et al. 2011), Stochastic bicriterion user-optimal (Dial 1996,
1997), Bi-objective UE (BUE) (Wang et al. 2009). Signiﬁcant contributions can be
made if these two factors are also incorporated into BRUE.
6.2.3 Transportation network design under bounded rationality
New methodologies are needed regarding the transportation network design problem
(NDP) with boundedly rational travel behavior. The classical network design problem
is usually formulated as a bi-level program: the upper level is the decision made to
either enhance capacities of the established links, apply congestion pricing, or add new
links to an existing road network; the lower level is an equilibrium problem, describing
how travelers are distributed within the new road network. Due to the existence of
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the indiﬀerence band, travelers may respond diﬀerently to a network design proposal,
leading to non-uniqueness of the equilibrium and causing diﬃculties in BRUE link ﬂow
pattern prediction and proposal evaluation. Therefore a new network design framework
needs to be established to accommodate boundedly rational route choice behavior.
The above three directions are mainly focused on generalizing ﬁndings of this dis-
sertation. Boundedly rational travel behavior is still understudied and broader research
directions need to be provided.
6.3 Future Research Directions
In this section, we will point out research gaps which need to be ﬁlled in the existing
literature.
6.3.1 Cognitive process
Bounded rationality, involving extensive psychology and behavorial aspects, has been
well-studied in economics and psychology for decades. However, the cognitive process of
boundedly rational travel behavior remains understudied in transportation. The travel
behavior decision-making is a complicated cognitive process and borrowing models from
these established ﬁelds can expedite BR research in transportation.
6.3.2 Game-theoretical BRUE model
The boudedly rational game-theoretical model results in boundedly rational equilibria
and its analytical properties are generally tractable. There is no such literature on
exploring boundedly rational user equilibria with the game theoretical approach. Great
contributions will be made if the boundedly rational ﬁnite game can be borrowed to
model travel behavior. In addition, travelers are usually treated as inﬁnitesimals and
large population approximation may also be needed to generalize boundedly rational
Nash equilibria to user equilibria.
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6.3.3 Boundedly rational multi-modal and route choice
Most existing dynamic travel behavioral models incorporated bounded rationality into
both departure-time and route choices and these two choices are jointly estimated. Mode
choice is always treated as a separate decision apart from these two choices. In future, a
unifying framework of boundedly rational multi-modal departure-time and route choices
should be developed to integrate all travel decisions.
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Appendix A
Acronyms and Appendix
Table A.1: Notation
N A set of consecutively numbered nodes
L A set of consecutively numbered links
a ∈ L Link index
W Origin-destination (OD) pair set connected by a set of simple
paths
Pw Simple paths (composed of a sequence of distinct nodes) connect-
ing OD pair w ∈ W
dw Traﬃc demand for OD pair w
d Traﬃc demand vector
fwi Flow on path i ∈ Pw for OD pair w
f = {fwi }w∈Wi∈Pw Path ﬂow vector
F Feasible path ﬂow set is to assign the traﬃc demand on the feasible
paths
xa Link ﬂow on link a
x = {xa}a∈L Link ﬂow vector
c(x) Link performance function
δwa,i Link-path incidence indicator, 1 if link a is on path i connecting
OD pair w, and 0 if not
Δ  {δwa,i}w∈Wa∈L,i∈P Link-path incidence matrix
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
C(f)  {Cwi (f)}w∈Wi∈P Path cost vector
⊥ Orthogonal sign representing the inner product of two vectors is
zero
(εw)w∈W Indiﬀerence band for OD pair w ∈ W
ε = (εw)w∈W , εw  0 Indiﬀerence band vector
πw Maximum path cost within εw for OD pair w
ρwi Indiﬀerence function for path i ∈ P connecting OD pair w ∈ W
Pεl Largest ε-acceptable path set
PUE User equilibrium shortest path set
FεBRUE ε-BRUE path ﬂow solution set
w-STT (d, ε) the maximum STT among the ε-BRUE solution set
b-STT (d, ε) the minimum STT among the ε-BRUE solution set
SRP (d, ε) region for the risk-prone paradox
SRN (d, ε) region for the risk-neutral paradox
SRA (d, ε) region for the risk-averse paradox
Table A.2: Acronyms
Acronym Meaning
PR Perfect rationality
BR Bounded rationality
OD Origin-destination pair
BRD Boundedly rational day-to-day dynamic
UE User equilibrium
DUE Dynamic user equilibrium
DUO Dynamic user optimal
DTA Dynamic traﬃc assignment
BRUE Boundedly rational user equilibrium
STT system travel time
MPEC Mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Acronym Meaning
RUM Random utility maximization
i.i.d. Independently identically distributed
m meter
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